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Probable Cause with Teeth
Cynthia Lee*
ABSTRACT
Recent incidents involving African Americans arrested by police for engaging in activities that would rarely lead to police intervention if engaged in
by white individuals highlight the need for clarity regarding how much certainty of guilt is required before an officer can arrest an individual. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has provided little guidance on exactly
how much certainty of guilt is required to establish probable cause, stating
only that probable cause is more than a mere suspicion, but less than the level
of proof needed to convict. In 1983, Justice Rehnquist lowered the bar significantly when he opined in Texas v. Brown that probable cause “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.”
Many lower courts have repeated Justice Rehnquist’s comment on probable
cause as if it were settled law. In doing so, very few seem to recognize that
Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion and the meaning of probable cause
was not the main issue before the Court.
This Article argues that Justice Rehnquist’s musings on the meaning of
probable cause in Texas v. Brown should not be followed for several reasons.
First, thirty-seven years ago, Justice Rehnquist was only able to get three other
Justices to sign onto his opinion. Texas v. Brown was just a plurality opinion,
and Justice Rehnquist’s statement on the showing required for a finding of
probable cause was not necessary to the judgment. More importantly, a majority of the Court has never repeated Justice Rehnquist’s statement that probable
cause means something less than the preponderance of the evidence standard
required in civil cases. Second, Justice Rehnquist’s view of probable cause is
misguided as a matter of history, precedent, and logic. Third, Justice Rehnquist’s view of probable cause allows for, and perhaps even fosters, racial disparity in arrests. A more robust showing should be required for a finding of
probable cause.

* Cynthia Lee is the Edward F. Howrey Research Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School. She thanks Andrew Crespo, Andrew Ferguson, and Jordan Blair
Woods for their feedback on a very early draft of this Article during the ABA Criminal Justice
Section Academic Roundtables in Washington, D.C., on November 1, 2018. She thanks Jack
Chin, Ashima Gray, Jennifer Chacón, Ji Seon Song, and Jonathan Glater for their feedback
when she presented this Article as a work-in-progress at CAPALF and Western POC at UNLV
School of Law in Las Vegas, Nevada on October 20, 2018. She thanks Michael Abramowicz for
his feedback on this Article. She also thanks Stephanie Hansen and Casey Matsumoto for excellent research and editorial assistance on this Article. Finally, she thanks Jeremy Allen-Arney,
Editor-in-Chief, Emma Hutchison, Senior Articles Editor, and Clayton Wild, Senior Managing
Editor, of The George Washington Law Review for making publication of this Article possible.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has provided very little clarity
on how much evidence is enough to support a finding of probable
cause. The Court has stated that probable cause is more than a mere
suspicion, but less than proof necessary to convict, that is, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1 This, however, tells us little since “more
than a mere suspicion” is any amount of suspicion over zero, which is
not much evidence at all, and “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is
the highest evidentiary standard available—enough to convince a jury
to convict a criminal defendant. In 1983, writing for a plurality in
Texas v. Brown,2 Justice Rehnquist moved the needle significantly
when he stated that probable cause “does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.”3 According to Justice Rehnquist more than three decades ago, probable cause
can be satisfied by less certainty than the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs in civil cases.
Since Texas v. Brown, lower courts and legal scholars alike have
repeated Justice Rehnquist’s statement on probable cause as if it were
well-settled law. In repeating this language, few have acknowledged
that Texas v. Brown was just a plurality opinion and that probable
cause was not the main issue before the Court.4 More importantly, a
majority of the Court has never repeated Justice Rehnquist’s statement that probable cause requires something less than a preponderance of the evidence.
This Article argues that Justice Rehnquist’s musings on probable
cause in Texas v. Brown should not be followed. Just how much evidence is necessary to support a finding of probable cause is an important question, especially since probable cause is all that is required to
validate an arrest in a public place.5 Once a law enforcement officer
has lawfully arrested an individual and taken the arrestee into custody, that arrest gives the officer the authority to conduct a full search
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174–75 (1949).
460 U.S. 730 (1983).
3 Id. at 742 (1983) (plurality opinion).
4 The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the seizure of a balloon containing heroin fell within the plain view doctrine. Id. at 732–35. Nonetheless, hundreds of lower
courts have repeated Justice Rehnquist’s language as if it were settled law. See infra notes
190–213 and accompanying text.
5 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1976) (holding that a warrantless arrest
in public based on probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment). Probable cause is
also needed for an arrest warrant, which gives an officer the authority to arrest an individual in
his or her own home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).
1
2
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of the arrestee’s person,6 including a search of any containers found
on the arrestee.7 Incident to that lawful custodial arrest, the officer
can also search anything within the arrestee’s wingspan or grabbing
distance.8 If the arrestee is an occupant or recent occupant of a vehicle, the officer can search the passenger compartment of the vehicle as
long as the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment or the officer has reason to believe there is
evidence of the crime of arrest in the vehicle.9 As part of the booking
process, an arrestee can be strip searched prior to being introduced
into the jail’s general population, even if there is no particularized reason to suspect the arrestee of hiding contraband or evidence in his or
her body cavities.10 All of the above can be done even if the individual
is arrested only for a minor offense, including a minor traffic offense
punishable by a fine with no jail time.11 And if the arrest is for a serious offense, an officer may collect the arrestee’s DNA without a warrant.12 That individual’s DNA can then be checked against DNA
collected in past, unsolved crimes—even though the individual has not
yet been tried, let alone found guilty of any crime.13 In short, probable
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
See id. at 224. This rule, however, does not apply to smartphones. If the officer finds a
smartphone on the arrestee’s person, the officer must get a search warrant before searching that
smartphone. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of
what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly
simple—get a warrant.”). For excellent commentary on cell phone searches and the Fourth
Amendment prior to the Riley decision, see generally Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets
the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27 (2008).
8 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969). Lower courts have interpreted the
term “wingspan” very liberally. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 524 F.3d 809, 811–12 (7th Cir.
2008) (finding that an entertainment center in the living room was within the defendant’s grabbing distance, even though defendant was handcuffed, lying face down, and surrounded by police officers in the kitchen at the time of the search); United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25,
50–51 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that a cabinet in a closet eight to ten feet away was within the
defendant’s immediate control); see also Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 203–05 (6th Cir.
1977) (permitting officers to seize a gun under a mattress in a bedroom after officers escorted
arrestee into that bedroom).
9 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
10 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 338–39 (2012).
11 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324, 354–55 (2001); see also Wayne A.
Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O’Connor’s Dissent in Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 79 MISS. L.J. 115 (2009) (examining Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in
Atwater).
12 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (“When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station
to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like
fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”).
13 See Ian Duncan, Police in Md. Holding DNA on People Not Convicted of Crimes, BALT.
6
7
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cause gives the officer the authority to do a whole lot more than just
arrest and take an individual into custody. This is particularly concerning when one considers that, on average, law enforcement officers in
the United States make 29,000 arrests each day.14
While this Article focuses on the probable cause standard for arrests, probable cause is also the level of justification required for many
other criminal procedures. Consider all the ways probable cause matters for purposes of criminal investigation. Most obviously, the Fourth
Amendment establishes probable cause as the standard for the issuance of a warrant to search or arrest.15 The Fourth Amendment explicitly states, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”16
As a general matter, probable cause is also required for warrantless searches. The Supreme Court has explained, “Ordinarily, a
search—even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant—must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation
of the law has occurred.”17 Many exceptions to the warrant requirement explicitly require probable cause even as they dispense with the
need for a warrant in advance of the search or seizure. For example,
probable cause is needed before an officer can conduct a warrantless
search of a motor vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.18 Probable cause is needed before an officer can
make a warrantless entry into a home under the exigent circumstances
SUN (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-dnadatabases-20130228-story.html [https://perma.cc/JAC5-B4C6]. To ease concerns raised by some
legislators and public defender offices, proponents of Maryland’s law allowing police to collect
DNA samples from persons arrested for serious crimes “agreed to . . . a provision that requires
that suspects’ DNA be thrown out if they are acquitted or their cases are dropped.” Id.; see also
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(2)(i) (West 2018) (“If all qualifying criminal charges
are determined to be unsupported by probable cause: [ ] the DNA sample shall be immediately
destroyed . . . .”).
14 Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (2018) (“There are on average
about 29,000 arrests per day in this country.”) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 (2017)).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court equates probable cause to search with
probable cause to arrest. William C. Moul, Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, 25 OHIO ST.
L.J. 502, 513 (1964).
16

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

17

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).

See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (upholding a warrantless search of
an automobile, including the compartments and containers within, because the officers had
probable cause to believe contraband was concealed somewhere within); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 155–56, 162 (1925) (holding that a warrantless seizure of an automobile
based upon probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband liquor does not contravene the Fourth Amendment).
18
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exception to the warrant requirement.19 Probable cause is needed for
a plain view search or seizure.20
Probable cause also enables an officer to shoot a fleeing felon. As
the Supreme Court held in Tennessee v. Garner,21 if an officer has
probable cause to believe a fleeing felon poses a threat of serious
physical harm to the officer or others, and if feasible gives a warning,
that officer can use deadly force to stop the suspect.22
If an officer has probable cause to believe a driver has committed
a traffic offense, the officer may pull the driver over even if the real
reason for the stop was because the officer had a mere hunch that the
driver was engaged in criminal activity and even if the officer based
this hunch on the driver’s race.23 Probable cause to arrest will also
defeat most claims of retaliatory arrest.24
Beyond the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context, probable cause is all that is needed for a prosecutor to charge an individual
with a crime.25 Probable cause is all that is needed before a grand jury
can issue an indictment.26 Probable cause is also the standard applied
19 See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) (noting that “police officers
need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful
entry into a home”).
20 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that probable cause is required
in order to invoke the plain view doctrine).
21 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
22 See id. at 11–12 (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force . . . if, where feasible, some warning has
been given.”).
23 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (finding vehicle stop reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment because officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code).
24 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) (holding that probable cause will “generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim”). If a case involves an arrest pursuant to an official policy of
retaliation, probable cause to arrest will not categorically bar a defendant from claiming retaliatory arrest. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1954–55 (2018). For an excellent
critique of the Nieves decision, see Garrett Epps, John Roberts Strikes a Blow Against Free
Speech, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/nieves-vbartlett-john-roberts-protects-police/590881/ [https://perma.cc/R9ME-9H4T] (noting that the
Nieves decision “will make it harder to hold officers to account when they—as we all know they
sometimes do—arrest citizens in retaliation for speech they don’t like,” even though the First
Amendment makes clear that “[a]n individual should not face official retaliation for engaging in
‘protected speech’ alone, even when that speech is unpleasant or hostile”).
25 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
26 Federal grand jurors are informed that probable cause is “[t]he finding necessary in
order to return an indictment against a person accused of a federal crime” and that “[a] finding
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by a magistrate judge at a preliminary hearing deciding whether to
bind over a defendant for trial.27 When an individual has been arrested and taken into custody without a warrant, a judicial determination of probable cause is needed to continue holding the individual.28
Clarifying and strengthening the meaning of probable cause is thus
important, not only because it will help protect individuals from the
harms of a custodial arrest, but also because it will help protect against
unjust searches and prosecutions.
Recent arrests of African Americans for conduct that rarely
would lead to police intervention when non–African Americans are
involved in similar activity highlight the need for more attention to the
question of what is required to constitute probable cause to arrest an
individual. Such incidents include the April 2018 arrest of two African
American men at a Philadelphia Starbucks store29 and the arrests of
21 African American partygoers in a vacant house in Northeast Washington, D.C. that culminated in a 2018 Supreme Court decision on
probable cause.30 Accordingly, one of the goals of this Article is to
of probable cause is proper only when the evidence presented to the grand jury, without any
explanation being offered by the accused, persuades 12 or more grand jurors that a federal crime
has probably been committed by the person accused.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS 2, 9 (“The grand jury . . . does not determine guilt or
innocence, but only whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and
that a specific person or persons committed it.”). For an excellent discussion of probable cause as
the standard to indict or bind over a defendant for trial, see also William Ortman, Probable
Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511, 513–16 (2016) (arguing that probable cause is problematic and should be abandoned as the standard used in grand jury indictments and preliminary
hearings).
27 See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (holding that the function of a preliminary
hearing is “determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial”). In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court noted that probable cause in the parole revocation context is akin to
probable cause in the preliminary hearing context, and defined probable cause as a “reasonable
ground to believe.” 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) (noting that a parole revocation hearing “should be
seen as in the nature of a ‘preliminary hearing’ to determine whether there is probable cause or
reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute
a violation of parole conditions”). Although the Court has never suggested that probable cause
in the preliminary hearing context is more stringent than probable cause in the arrest context,
one lower court has suggested that the former requires a higher showing than the latter. See
Williams v. Kobel, 789 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t is clear to us that the probable cause
determination at the preliminary hearing is far more stringent and far more concerned with legal
technicalities than the probable cause determination made by an arresting officer . . . .”).
28

See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).

29

See infra text accompanying notes 280–95.

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018); see also Brief for Respondents at 2,
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (No. 15-1485) (referring to the neighborhood as “low-income, predominantly African-American”); id. at 51 (“African-Americans, like Respondents, are often distrustful of the police.”).
30
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shed light on the Supreme Court’s very unclear probable cause jurisprudence. This Article’s primary objective, however, is to persuade
lower courts not to follow Justice Rehnquist’s description of probable
cause in Texas v. Brown.31
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview
of the Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence on probable cause.32
Two themes frame the analysis in this part: (1) the Court’s lack of
clarity regarding the meaning of probable cause,33 and (2) the Court’s
tendency in its probable cause jurisprudence to favor the government
instead of the individual who was searched or arrested.34
Part II focuses on Justice Rehnquist’s statement in Texas v.
Brown that probable cause does not demand a showing that the officer’s belief that the arrestee was engaged in criminal activity be
“more likely true than false,”35 and analyzes the influence this statement has had on lower court jurisprudence and legal scholarship. Almost every single lower court that has considered the meaning of
probable cause has repeated this language as if it were settled law.36
Even prominent legal scholars have cited this language as if it were
settled law.37
Part III argues that Texas v. Brown should not be viewed as settled law for several reasons. First, Justice Rehnquist was only able to
get three other Justices to sign onto his opinion.38 Texas v. Brown was
just a plurality opinion, and his statement on the showing required for
a finding of probable cause was not necessary to the judgment.39
Second, Justice Rehnquist’s view of probable cause is wrong as a
matter of history, precedent, and logic. It is wrong as a matter of history because it conflicts with the Framers’ desire to constrain the government’s arrest and search powers.40 It is wrong as a matter of
precedent because prior to Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court had
never suggested that the degree of belief associated with probable
See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
For a more complete history of the Court’s probable cause jurisprudence, see Craig S.
Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 957 (2003) (noting that the
Supreme Court’s probable cause jurisprudence dates back to the Warren Court’s decision in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
33 See discussion infra Section I.A.
34 See discussion infra Section I.B.
35 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
36 See discussion infra Section II.A.
37 See discussion infra Section II.B.
38 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 732.
39 See discussion infra Section III.A.
40 See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
31
32
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cause was something less than a preponderance of the evidence.41
Moreover, since Texas v. Brown, a majority of the Court has never
endorsed Justice Rehnquist’s stunted characterization of probable
cause. The Court has been quite steadfast in its view that judicial officers have broad discretion when assessing whether an officer had
probable cause to arrest or search. Justice Rehnquist’s view is also
wrong as a matter of logic because the term “probable cause” itself
suggests that it must be probable, that is, more likely than not, that the
person being arrested has committed a crime.42 When an officer says,
“I have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that Person A committed that crime,” the officer is essentially
claiming he has reasonable grounds for believing that Person A committed a crime.43 Probable cause to arrest, as the Supreme Court has
often stated, means that the officer thinks there is a fair probability
that Person A committed a crime.44 It simply does not make logical
sense to say that the officer with probable cause thinks that there is a
less than fifty percent chance that Person A has committed a crime.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist’s view of probable cause allows, and
perhaps even fosters, racial disparity in arrests. Lowering the threshold of certainty needed for probable cause makes it easier for officers
to arrest individuals.45 Police officers, however, cannot arrest every
single person for whom they have probable cause to arrest and, necessarily, will exercise their discretion in choosing who they actually arrest. Although most officers probably do not intend to discriminate on
the basis of race, racial stereotypes are likely to color their perceptions of who seems suspicious and therefore, is worthy of arrest.46 An
extremely low threshold of certainty for probable cause means the
bulk of these arrests will be deemed justifiable. Racial disparity in arrests is something the law should seek to avoid.
41

See discussion infra Section III.B.2.

See discussion infra Section III.B.3.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (“ ‘The substance of all the definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’ ” (quoting McCarthy v. De
Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881))); Carroll v. United States; 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (same).
44 Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (stating that all probable cause “require[s] is
the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians,
act’ ” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 231 (1983))); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 246 (noting that “probable cause does not demand . . . certainty” and that a “fair probability” is
sufficient).
45 See discussion infra Section III.C.
46 L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2038–39 (2011) (explaining how the operation of implicit racial biases can cause the police
to target, stop, and search Blacks more often than Whites).
42
43
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When Justice Rehnquist suggested thirty-seven years ago in Texas
v. Brown that probable cause need not be correct nor more likely true
than false, he significantly lowered the bar for probable cause. Probable cause should be more robust for the protection of all civilians.
Lower courts should reject Justice Rehnquist’s definition of probable
cause in Texas v. Brown. Rather than follow the view that probable
cause does not require more than fifty percent certainty,47 judicial officers deciding whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual
should insist on a more robust showing of certainty from the arresting
officer. At least in most cases,48 before an officer can execute a custodial arrest, she should have more than a fifty percent certainty that the
individual has committed the offense for which he is being arrested. If
probable cause turns on probabilities, as the Supreme Court has often
stated,49 it ought to mean that it is at least probable that a crime has
been committed and that the individual being arrested committed that
crime.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
PROBABLE CAUSE

ON

A. Incapable of Precise Definition
Legal scholars agree that probable cause “has not been defined
with sufficient precision.”50 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that “[a]rticulating precisely what . . . ‘probable cause’ mean[s]
is not possible.”51 According to the Court, “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of
the circumstances.”52 On another occasion, the Court stated, “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities
in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.”53 Along these lines, the Court has opined
that “probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.”54
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
Some scholars have argued that the amount of certainty required for probable cause
should vary depending on the severity of the offense. See infra Section I.C.2.
49 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
50 E.g., Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 789, 795 (2013).
51 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
52 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983)).
53 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (emphasis added).
54 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
47
48
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One problem with these pronouncements is that they offer very
little guidance to courts and police officers in practice. As Ronald
Bacigal notes, “[t]he inability to formulate clear rules or precise
probability levels governing probable cause has [led] the Court to
adopt one over-arching rule for the police—just use your common
sense and act reasonably.”55 What constitutes acting reasonably, however, is subjective. What may seem reasonable to one person may
seem completely unreasonable to another.56
Somewhat more definitively, the Court has explained that
“[p]robable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within . . .
[the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being
committed.”57 The Court has also said that “ ‘[t]he substance of all the
definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt.’ ”58 Moreover, “the belief of guilt must be particularized with
respect to the person to be searched or seized.”59 In other words,
probable cause to arrest an individual requires a reasonable ground
for believing both that an offense has been, or is being, committed and
that a particular person—the person being arrested—is responsible
for committing that offense. Just how much certainty is sufficient to
55 Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS.
L.J. 279, 318 (2004).
56 As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in his dissent in Strickland v. Washington objecting
to the standard of reasonableness for establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
adopted by the Court, “[t]o tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave ‘reasonably’ and must act like ‘a reasonably competent attorney,’ is to tell
them almost nothing.” 466 U.S. 668, 707–08 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citation
omitted); see also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (NYU Press 2003) (showing how the reasonableness requirement
in provocation and self-defense law often leads to disparate results because of race, gender,
sexual orientation and gender identity); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 903
(2009) (finding that rather than being a clear cut case in which no reasonable juror could find
that the police officer acted unreasonably, as Justice Scalia writing for the Court in Scott v.
Harris suggested was the case, over a thousand individuals who viewed a dashboard camera
videotape of a high-speed police chase that ended with the officer ramming his patrol car into
the Respondent’s car with enough force to render him a quadriplegic were deeply divided over
whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable); Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police
Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U.
ILL. L. REV. 629, 655 (noting that reasonableness in the context of assessing a police officer’s use
of force “is such an open-ended standard; alone, it provides little-to-no guidance to the jury”).
57 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
58 Id. at 175 (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (Pa. 1881)).
59 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
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constitute a “reasonable ground,” however, is not so clear. It just
needs to be somewhere between more than a mere suspicion and less
than proof necessary to convict.60
B. Deference to the Government
Not only has the Supreme Court provided a very mushy definition of probable cause that appears to require not much in the way of
certainty, but also, on almost every single question involving probable
cause, the Court has ruled in favor of the government and against the
defendant. For example, the Court has held that probable cause to
arrest or search can be based on evidence that would be inadmissible
at trial.61 Other relevant cases in which the Court has favored the government over the defendant include situations where the police officer
did not have probable cause as to the crime of arrest, but where a
court found post hoc probable cause for another offense; probable
cause based on informant tips; probable cause established by dog
sniffs; and probable cause based on a common enterprise theory when
several individuals were found in a car with drugs.
1. Wrong Crime or Wrong Person, No Problem
If a police officer arrests an individual for a crime but lacks probable cause for the crime that triggered the arrest, the Supreme Court
has held that the arrest is still valid if the officer would have had probable cause to arrest the individual for any other crime.62 In Devenpeck
v. Alford,63 police officers arrested Jerome Alford for recording his
conversations with them during a traffic stop.64 Alford was taken to
jail where he was charged with violating the State Privacy Act.65 A
state trial court dismissed the charge because Alford’s recording of his
conversation with the officers was not, in fact, a crime under the State
Privacy Act, and the officers were wrong in thinking that Alford had
violated this law.66
Alford sued the officers for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, alleging that the officers arrested him without probable cause in
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
See id. at 173 (finding that evidence excluded at trial was properly admitted at suppression hearing where issue was whether officer had probable cause to search).
62 See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004).
63 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
64 Id. at 149–50.
65 Id. at 150.
66 Id. at 151.
60
61
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violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.67 Even though
recording a conversation with a police officer was not a crime under
the law of the state where Alford was arrested, which meant that the
officers clearly could not have had probable cause as to this supposed
“crime,” the jury was instructed that for Alford to prevail, he had to
demonstrate that the officers arrested him without probable cause and
that probable cause exists “if the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to conclude that the suspect has committed, is committing, or was
about to commit a crime.”68 Understanding this instruction to mean
that probable cause exists if the prudent person would conclude that
Alford had committed, was committing, or was about to commit any
crime, the jury found for the officers.69
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the officers could not have had probable cause to
arrest Alford because “[t]ape recording officers conducting a traffic
stop is not a crime in Washington.”70 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
officers’ claim that Alford’s arrest was valid because they had probable cause to arrest him for other crimes, namely, impersonating and
obstructing a law enforcement officer, because these other crimes
were not closely related to the offense for which Alford was actually
arrested.71
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, noting that a
“warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”72 The Court explained that the
probable cause inquiry is an objective inquiry and that the “arresting
officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant
to the existence of probable cause.”73 In short, the Court agreed with
the government’s position that if a court or jury decides after the fact
that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for a crime
other than the crime of arrest, the arrest will be valid even if the arresting officer did not realize at the time that there was probable
cause to arrest for another offense.
Id.
See id. (quoting the jury instructions).
69 See id.
70 Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146 (2004).
71 Id.
72 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152.
73 Id. at 153.
67
68
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Additionally, the Court has held that if the police have probable
cause to arrest Person A for a crime and they arrest Person B, mistakenly but reasonably believing that Person B is Person A, their arrest
of Person B is valid.74 In Hill v. California,75 police officers had probable cause to arrest Archie Hill for robbery, and arrested a man who
matched Hill’s age and physical description and who answered the
door of Hill’s apartment—but who turned out not to be Hill.76 Regardless, the Court found that because the police officers had probable cause to arrest Hill and had a “reasonable, good faith belief that
the arrestee” was Hill, the arrest of the wrong person was valid.77
2. Informant Tips
Another example of the Supreme Court favoring the government
over the defendant is reflected in its treatment of probable cause in
the informant context. In the 1960s, the Court set forth a two–prong
test for probable cause in cases where police rely in whole or in part
on an informant’s tip to establish probable cause. Under the twoprong Aguilar–Spinelli test,78 the government had to affirmatively establish (1) the informant’s basis of knowledge, meaning “the particular means by which [the informant] came by the information given in
his report,”79 and (2) the informant’s veracity, meaning the credibility
of the informant or the reliability of the information.80 In other words,
the government had to show both how the informant got his information and why the informant was credible or why the information the
informant provided to the police was trustworthy or reliable.81
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971).
401 U.S. 797 (1971).
76 Id. at 799.
77 Id. at 802.
78 See generally Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), overruled by Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), overruled by Gates, 462
U.S. at 238.
79 Gates, 462 U.S. at 228 (describing the basis of knowledge prong in the two-pronged
Aguilar-Spinelli test); see also Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 (noting that “the magistrate must be
informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were”).
80 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. The Court in Gates noted that an informant’s “veracity” is an
important factor in determining the weight of an informant’s tip without defining the term. The
term “veracity” generally refers to a person’s truthfulness. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469
U.S. 45, 55 (1984) (referring to veracity as “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 608(b))); Veracity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “veracity” as “[h]abitual regard for and observance of the truth; truthful nature” and “[c]onsistency
with the truth; accuracy”).
81 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.
74
75
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In 1983, the Court in Illinois v. Gates82 did a complete about-face,
and abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of a “totality-of-thecircumstances” test for determining probable cause in informant
cases.83 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that
an informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge were “all
highly relevant in determining the value of his report,”84 but noted
that these factors should not be “understood as entirely separate and
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case . . . .”85
Instead, basis of knowledge and veracity “should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues” that bear on whether there is probable cause.86
In explaining the Court’s decision to abandon the Aguilar-Spinelli
test,87 Justice Rehnquist described probable cause as “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.”88 While Illinois v. Gates was a case about probable cause specifically in the informant context, its language on probable cause has
been repeated in many other cases involving probable cause.89
In Illinois v. Gates, Justice Rehnquist listed examples where the
government could prevail in establishing probable cause under its new
totality of the circumstances test where it would not have prevailed
under the old Aguilar-Spinelli test:
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 230. The Spinelli Court had expressly rejected a totality of the circumstances approach. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415 (“We believe . . . the ‘totality of circumstances’ approach
taken by the Court of Appeals paints with too broad a brush. Where, as here, the informer’s tip
is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a
more precise analysis.”). For a defense of the Gates decision, see Joseph D. Grano, Probable
Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 J.L. REFORM 465, 518–19
(1984) (arguing that the Court in Gates correctly abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged
test).
84 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 238 (“[W]e conclude that it is wiser to abandon the ‘two-pronged test’ established
by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli.”).
88 Id. at 232.
89 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 2010); Brown v. City of New York, 201 F. Supp. 3d 328, 331
(E.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Valentine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 (W.D. Va. 2007).
82
83
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serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based
on his tip.90
Justice Rehnquist continued, “Likewise, if an unquestionably
honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which
if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we have found
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.”91
Accordingly, under the Illinois v. Gates test, a strong showing on
one prong can make up for a weak showing on the other prong.92 One
problem with not requiring a showing of both basis of knowledge and
veracity is that an “unquestionably honest citizen,”93 strong on the veracity prong, but without any basis of knowledge, can be badly mistaken. For example, on September 12, 2002,94 approximately one year
after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001,95 Eunice Stone, a woman who likely was considered “unquestionably honest”96 by the police, reported a conversation she
overheard and found very disturbing while eating at a Shoney’s restaurant in Calhoun, Georgia.97 According to Stone, three men who
appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent were laughing and joking
about what happened on September 11, 2001.98 Stone told police that
one of the men said, “If they [Americans] mourn Sept[ember] 11,
what will they think about Sept[ember] 13?”99 and another spoke
90

Gates, 462 U.S. at 233.

91

Id. at 233–34.

92

See id. at 233.

93

Id.

See David M. Halbfinger, Terror Scare in Florida: False Alarm, But Televised, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/14/us/terror-scare-in-florida-falsealarm-but-televised.html [https://perma.cc/G3XP-FXPM].
94

95 On September 11, 2001, terrorists flew planes into the World Trade Center in New York
City and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia. James Barron, Thousands Feared Dead as World
Trade Center Is Toppled, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/national/thousands-feared-dead-as-world-trade-center-is-toppled.html [https://perma.cc/C8AGY8NT]. Another plane crashed in Pennsylvania. Id. More than 2,997 people died as a result of
the 9/11 attacks. Aaron Katersky, The 9/11 Toll Still Grows: More Than 16,000 Ground Zero
Responders Who Got Sick Found Eligible for Awards, ABC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2018), https://
abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/US/911-toll-growsl-16000-ground-responders-sick-found/
story?id=57669657 [https://perma.cc/5CNW-7DVP].
96 Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; see also Vikram Amar, The Golden Rule of Racial Profiling, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/22/opinion/op-amar22 [https://
perma.cc/HX57-EQVG] (“Stone, by all accounts, had no incentive to victimize the men. More
generally, she does not seem like the kind of person to purposefully lie to the police.”).
97

See Halbfinger, supra note 94.

98

See id.

99

Id.

R
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about “bringing down” something.100 Stone also claimed the men were
speaking in a language that sounded like Arabic.101
Stone followed the men when they left the restaurant, wrote
down the license plate numbers of their cars, and then called the
Georgia State Patrol to report what she heard.102 Police caught up
with the men in Florida.103 The three men were arrested, handcuffed,
then detained for more than seventeen hours while police searched
their cars.104 The searches revealed nothing indicating a plot to commit a terroristic act against the United States.105
The three men Stone thought were terrorists were actually medical students on their way to Larkin Community Hospital in Miami,
where they were planning to begin a series of nine-week rotations.106
Their entire conversation was in English, not Arabic, since only one of
the men knew any Arabic.107 While the three men were of Middle
Eastern descent,108 they were all legally in the country, and two were
U.S. citizens.109 According to the men, “bringing down” something referred to a car that one of the men wanted to bring down to Miami.110
Even though the men were eventually released from police custody
and never charged with a crime, the hospital revoked their internships
because of the controversy over the conversation they allegedly had at
the restaurant.111
Amar, supra note 96.
Terror Scare Men: ‘We Want Our Dignity Back’, CNN (Sept. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Terror Scare Men], http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/09/17/fla.students.talk/index.html [https://
perma.cc/6GSH-3GWS].
102 Halbfinger, supra note 94.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id.; Press Release, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., ADC Calls for Thorough
Investigation of Terror False Alarm in Florida (Sept. 17, 2002), http://www.adc.org/adc-calls-forthorough-investigation-of-terror-false-alarm-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/9YGU-TT7F] (expressing concern about the circumstances leading to the arrest and seventeen-hour detention of the
three medical students and noting that the men believed Eunice Stone’s concerns were
prompted by their “Middle Eastern and Muslim appearance”).
106 Halbfinger, supra note 94.
107 See Terror Scare Men, supra note 101 (noting that the medical students told CNN that
only one of them understands and speaks Arabic).
108 Halbfinger, supra note 94.
109 Id.; see also Amar, supra note 96.
110 See Amar, supra note 96; see also Terror Scare Men, supra note 101 (noting that one of
the medical students told CNN that he was the only one of the three that hadn’t yet purchased a
car, explaining, “So my plan was that once we get to Miami I would buy a car before classes
started, and I said that in case I don’t find one in Miami, I could have one shipped down from
Kansas City”).
111 See Terror Scare Men supra note 101; see also Halbfinger, supra note 94.
100

R

101

R

R
R
R
R
R

R
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If a court in the Eunice Stone example had to assess whether
probable cause existed to arrest the men, the government could make
a strong showing on the veracity prong since they had a witness who
appeared to be of unquestionable honesty with no apparent motive to
lie about what she heard.112 The problem here was that Eunice Stone
had no basis for knowing what she claimed to know.113 She was not a
friend or colleague of the three men with intimate knowledge of their
plans.114 She had not observed the men engaging in any criminal activity.115 She had simply overheard a conversation that she mistakenly
thought was a plot to commit a terrorist act.116 But according to Illinois v. Gates, the government’s very weak showing of basis of knowledge could be overcome by its strong showing on the veracity front.117
Under Illinois v. Gates, tips from people like Eunice Stone can establish valid probable cause for arrest.
In explaining how to apply the new totality of circumstances approach to probable cause, Justice Rehnquist also emphasized that it is
unnecessary for judicial officers to find an informant’s information
trustworthy or the informant credible as long as the informant gives a
lot of detail and claims the information is based on first-hand knowledge, stating, “[E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s
motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing,
along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles
his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.”118
In his dissent, Justice Brennan provided a hypothetical illustrating
how a tipster might give the police an abundance of detail and claim
first-hand knowledge that a person is involved in criminal activity, but
it would not be wise to find probable cause to believe there was evidence of a crime in the place in question:
[Suppose] a reliable informant states there is gambling
equipment in Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe
in detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified
before applying for the warrant. He was right about 201, but
that hardly makes him more believable about the equipment
in 607. But what if he states that there are narcotics locked in
a safe in Apartment 300, which is described in detail, and the
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

See Amar, supra note 96.
Halbfinger, supra note 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 234.

R
R
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apartment manager verifies everything but the contents of
the safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics is made
appreciably more believable by the verification. The informant could still have gotten his information concerning the
safe from others about whom nothing is known or could
have inferred the presence of narcotics from circumstances
which a magistrate would find unacceptable.119
Hypotheticals aside, a person with an axe to grind or grudge can
provide an abundance of false details to the police and claim firsthand knowledge of those details in order to harass another person.
For example, in September 2012, a man named Kenny Smith called
the police and told them that another man, Christopher Shell, was on
a U.S. Airways flight from Philadelphia to Dallas with liquid explosives.120 Based on this tip, the police asked the pilot to bring the plane
down, and the flight was “turned around and forced to return to Philadelphia.”121 Shell was taken off the plane at gunpoint, detained, and
interrogated while the plane and his luggage were searched.122 No explosives were found on the plane, in Shell’s luggage, or on Shell’s person, and Shell was released.123 Later, the police discovered that Smith
had called in the tip because he was angry at Shell for posting photos
of Smith’s girlfriend, who was Shell’s ex-girlfriend, on Facebook.124
While the police certainly had sufficient justification to take Shell off
119 Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 427
(1969) (White, J., concurring)). This hypothetical was originally posed by Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring).
120 Christina Ng & Richard Esposito, Plane Bomb Hoax to “Avenge” Compromising
Photos, Cops Say, ABC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/US/plane-bomb-hoaxavenge-compromising-facebook-photos-cops/story?id=17182136#.UFtQbK45iko [https://
perma.cc/8Z63-EF67]; see also Richard Esposito & Christina Ng, Police: Angry Ex-Girlfriend
Triggered US Airways Bomb Hoax, ABC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-angry-girlfriend-triggered-us-airways-bomb-hoax/story?id=17170280 [https://perma.cc/
PS7H-BWZ2] (reporting that Shell had “been sped through security by a friend at the airport”
and had posted to Facebook that “getting through security had been a breeze,” which caught the
FBI’s attention and led to “bomb techs, cops, FBI agents and K-9 dogs descend[ing] on the flight
and conduct[ing] a full search”); Tim Jimenez, et al., Philadelphia Man Charged With Fake Report of Bomb Aboard Airliner, CBS PHILA. (Sept. 7, 2012), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/
2012/09/07/philadelphia-man-charged-with-fake-report-of-bomb-aboard-airliner/ [https://
perma.cc/R73J-2PAH] (reporting that Smith called in the tip from a payphone using the name
“George Michaels”); Victim of Philadelphia Plane Explosives Hoax Later Arrested in Texas, FOX
NEWS (last updated Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/us/victim-of-philadelphia-plane-explosives-hoax-later-arrested-in-texas [https://perma.cc/VS4B-M8LG].
121 Ng & Esposito, supra note 120; see also Esposito & Ng, supra note 120.
122 See Esposito & Ng, supra note 120; Ng & Esposito, supra note 120.
123 See Ng & Esposito, supra note 120.
124 Id. Smith was arrested and charged with conveying false and misleading information to
police. See id.

R
R
R
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the plane and temporarily detain him while they searched him and his
luggage to confirm whether Smith’s tip was correct,125 arresting
Shell—who was not carrying liquid explosives and was simply trying
to travel to celebrate his birthday—would not have been appropriate.126 Yet under the totality of the circumstances test announced in
Illinois v. Gates, a court asked to decide whether there was probable
cause to justify an arrest could conclude that the police had probable
cause to arrest Shell since the tipster had provided police with a lot of
details of alleged wrongdoing and claimed first-hand knowledge that
Shell was carrying liquid explosives on the plane.
3. Dog Sniffs
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on probable cause in the context of a dog sniff is another example of the Court favoring the government over the defendant. In Florida v. Harris,127 the Court
considered whether an alert by a drug detection dog during a traffic
stop established probable cause to search a vehicle.128 In this case, the
Florida Supreme Court found that the officer lacked probable cause
to search the defendant’s vehicle because the State failed to establish
that the dog in question was reliable.129 The Florida Supreme Court
explained that a drug detection dog’s alert establishes probable cause
only if the State can produce certain evidence, including:
the dog’s training and certification records, an explanation of
the meaning of the particular training and certification, field
performance records (including any unverified alerts), and
evidence concerning the experience and training of the of125 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that, as a general matter, police must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to forcibly stop an individual and reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous before they can frisk
that individual, but that “the right to frisk [is] immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop
is . . . an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence”).
126 There is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a temporary detention, which
only requires reasonable suspicion, and a de facto arrest, which is when the police do not formally place an individual under arrest but the detention counts as an arrest, which requires
probable cause. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503, 495 (1983) (finding that a defendant was
arrested before he was formally placed under arrest, even though only fifteen minutes had
elapsed from the time officers initially approached respondent until contraband was discovered
and the defendant arrested). Accordingly, even if Shell was not formally placed under arrest,
being handcuffed and led off the plane at gunpoint, then detained, searched, and interrogated,
while the plane and his luggage were also searched, may have constituted a de facto arrest.
127

568 U.S. 237 (2013).

128

Id. at 240.

129

See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 774 (Fla. 2011).
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ficer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog’s reliability.130
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “[t]he test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’ ”131
The Court stated that all probable cause requires “is the kind of ‘fair
probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal
technicians, act.’ ”132 The Court explained that in evaluating probable
cause, “we have consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances” and “rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic
inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach.”133 In delineating the evidence the State was required to produce to establish probable cause in the dog sniff context, the Florida
Supreme Court had, in the Court’s view, imposed an overly rigid rule
that made it too difficult for the State to establish probable cause. As
in Illinois v. Gates, the Court in Florida v. Harris eschewed a bright
line rule requiring the government to provide objective evidence of
reliability in favor of a less precise standard that allows the trial court
to find that the government has established probable cause whenever
the court is inclined to do so.
4. Cars as Places Where Occupants Engage in Common
Criminal Enterprises
Another example of the Supreme Court favoring the government
over individual defendants is when a police officer pulls over a car
with more than one occupant and finds contraband in the car. In Maryland v. Pringle,134 the Court held that an officer who finds drugs and
money in a car during a lawful traffic stop has probable cause to arrest
all the occupants of the vehicle for possession of the drugs.135
In Pringle, an officer stopped a car for speeding around 3:00
AM.136 There were three men in the car: the driver, a front-seat passenger, and a back-seat passenger.137 The officer received consent
from the driver to search the vehicle, and found over $700 in the glove
compartment and five plastic baggies of cocaine hidden behind the
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. at 242–43 (quoting Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d at 775).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
Id.
540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
Id. at 372.
Id. at 368.
Id.
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backseat armrest.138 The officer asked the men who owned the drugs
and money “and told them that if no one admitted to ownership of the
drugs he was going to arrest them all.”139 No one admitted to owning
the cash or drugs, so the officer arrested all three men and transported
them to the police station.140
Later that morning, Joseph Pringle, the front-seat passenger, admitted that the cocaine was his and that he “intended to sell the cocaine or use it for sex.”141 Pringle told police that the two others in the
car “did not know about the drugs,” and they were released.142 Before
his trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, Pringle
moved to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest.143 The
trial court denied Pringle’s motion, finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest him.144 Pringle was convicted and sentenced to ten
years in prison.145
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed Pringle’s conviction.146 The Court of Appeals held that the mere finding of cocaine in
the backseat armrest of a car was insufficient to establish probable
cause to arrest Pringle for possession of cocaine given that there were
two other people in the car at the time of the arrest and that the arresting officer did not have additional facts to establish that Pringle,
specifically, had knowledge of or control over the cocaine.147
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland.148 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist noted that it
was uncontested that upon finding the five baggies, the officer had
probable cause to believe a felony had been committed and, therefore
the sole question before the Court was whether the officer had probable cause to believe Pringle had committed that crime.149 To answer
the probable cause question, Justice Rehnquist started by noting that
Id.
Id.
140 Id. at 368–69.
141 Id. at 369 (internal citation omitted).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1033 (Md. 2002).
147 Id. at 1027 (“Without additional facts available to the officer at that time that would
tend to establish petitioner’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when petitioner was a front seat passenger in a car being
driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for possession.”).
148 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369.
149 Id. at 370.
138
139
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probable cause is “incapable of precise definition or quantification
into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on
the totality of the circumstances.”150 He also stated, as the Court did in
Illinois v. Gates, that probable cause is “a fluid concept . . . not readily,
or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,”151 though he did
not repeat the “not . . . more likely true than false” language from his
plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown.152
Justice Rehnquist then observed that the cash was “in the glove
compartment directly in front of Pringle” and the cocaine was located
“behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to all three men” in the
car.153 He pointed out that “[u]pon questioning, the three men failed
to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine
or the money.”154 Justice Rehnquist opined, “[w]e think it an entirely
reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the
cocaine,” and concluded, “[t]hus, a reasonable officer could conclude
that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime
of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.”155
Rejecting Pringle’s argument that it was improper to suggest
probable cause existed from the mere fact that he was found in a car
with drugs, Justice Rehnquist opined that “a car passenger . . . will
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have
the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing.”156 Expressing what could be called a “common enterprise theory” of probable cause, Justice Rehnquist explained that it
would be “reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise
among the three men,” especially given the quantity of the drugs and
cash in the car.157 To Justice Rehnquist, the cash and drugs suggested
the men were probably dealing drugs, “an enterprise to which a dealer
would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to
furnish evidence against him.”158
Though the Court could have easily concluded that it was more
likely the drugs found in the backseat armrest belonged to the
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 371.
Id. at 370–71 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 373 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)).
Id.
Id.

R
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driver—since it was his car and he could have hidden the drugs anywhere within the car, including in the backseat armrest—or the backseat passenger—since he was in closest proximity to the backseat
armrest—it instead found there was probable cause to arrest all three
men because occupants of a car found with drugs within are likely to
be involved in a “common [criminal] enterprise.”159
C. Open Questions
Although the Supreme Court has said a great deal about probable cause, it has left several questions unanswered. For example, the
Court has never clearly decided whether probable cause to arrest requires probable cause on each and every element of the offense of
arrest. Additionally, it has never clearly decided whether the amount
of certainty required for a finding of probable cause should vary depending upon the gravity of the offense.
1. Whether Probable Cause to Arrest Requires Probable Cause
on Each and Every Element of the Offense of Arrest
One question that remains open is whether probable cause to arrest requires probable cause for each and every element of the offense.160 The Court has, however, given us a hint as to how it would
answer this question should the issue ever come squarely before the
Court in the future. In District of Columbia v. Wesby,161 a large group
of people attending a party at a vacant house were arrested for unlawful entry.162 Sixteen of the partygoers, Respondents, challenged their
arrest, arguing that the arresting officers did not have reasonable
grounds to believe Respondents knew or had reason to know that
they were in the house without permission since Respondents had
been invited to the party by someone who had been in negotiations
with the owner of the house to rent the house.163 Because the police
lacked probable cause on the mens rea element of unlawful entry, Re159

Id.

Corbin Houston, Note, Probable Cause Means Probable Cause: Why the Circuit Courts
Should Uniformly Require Officers to Establish Probable Cause for Every Element of an Offense,
2016 U. CHI. L.F. 809, 813 (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether probable cause must be proven for every element of the offense of arrest and that the lower courts are
split over this question).
160

161

138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).

See generally id.
Brief for Respondents at i, 7–9, District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018)
(No. 15-1485).
162
163
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spondents argued the police lacked probable cause to arrest the
partygoers for the offense of unlawful entry.164
The Court did not explicitly take a position on whether the government must show probable cause on each and every element of the
offense for which an individual is arrested. However, the Court spent
the bulk of its opinion explaining why the officers had good reason to
believe that the partygoers knew or had reason to know that they
were in the house without the owner’s permission, which suggests that
the Court accepted Respondents’ argument and would rule, if this issue came up in a future case, that probable cause is required on each
and every element of the offense of arrest.165
2. Whether the Court Should Adopt a Sliding Scale or
Fluctuating Standard of Probable Cause
Another question that the Court has not yet addressed is whether
the amount of evidence or certainty needed for a finding of probable
cause should vary depending upon the gravity of the offense at issue.
In other words, if the offense in question is very serious, should the
government be able to make a showing of probable cause on less
proof than would be necessary if the offense were not as grave?
The closest the Court has come to addressing this issue was in
Florida v. J.L.,166 in which the issue was whether the police had reasonable suspicion—the standard for police to conduct a brief, temporary detention of a person167—to stop and frisk an individual.168
Florida v. J.L. was not a case about whether the police had probable
cause to support an arrest. The Court has often stated that “reasonable suspicion” requires less certainty than “probable cause.”169
In Florida v. J.L., police received an anonymous tip that a young
black male standing at a particular bus stop, wearing a plaid shirt, was
carrying a handgun.170 Based on the tip, the police went to the bus
stop and saw three black males, one of whom was in a plaid shirt.171
Id. at 7–9.
See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586–88.
166 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
167 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
168 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 266.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (reasoning that “the level of
suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause”);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (stating that the reasonable
suspicion standard applies “when law enforcement officials must make a limited intrusion on less
than probable cause”).
170 J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
171 Id.
164
165
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An officer approached J.L., the young man in the plaid shirt, told him
to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and found a gun in
his pocket.172
J.L., who was fifteen-years-old at the time, was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm
while under the age of eighteen.173 He moved to suppress the gun as
the product of an unlawful search.174 The trial court granted his motion, and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, holding that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk.175 The
Court felt it particularly significant that the anonymous tip in this case
contained only identifying information but no predictive information
about the future movement of the subject.176
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg left open the possibility
that the Court might allow a finding of reasonable suspicion on similar
facts if the crime in question was more serious than illegal possession
of a firearm, stating, “We do not say, for example, that a report of a
person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand
for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”177 If the Court were to go one step further and formally recognize a fluctuating standard of reasonable
suspicion, varying the level of proof needed to establish reasonable
suspicion depending on the gravity of the offense at issue, it would be
hard-pressed not to also do so in the probable cause context. At the
very least, a lower court might rely on Justice Ginsburg’s language in
Florida v. J.L. to support a sliding scale standard of probable cause.
Aside from Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion in Florida v. J.L. that
the Court might be open to a fluctuating standard of reasonable suspicion—which might be interpreted by some as possible support for a
fluctuating standard of probable cause—the only other time a Supreme Court Justice has expressed support for a fluctuating standard
of probable cause was over seventy years ago.178 In 1949, Justice Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar v. United States,179 provided perhaps the
strongest defense so far of the view that the amount of certainty nec172

Id.

173

Id. at 269.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 272.

176

Id. at 271.

177

Id. at 273–74.

178

See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

179

338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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essary for a finding of probable cause should differ depending on the
seriousness of the crime at issue:
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon
the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example, that a
child is kidnaped [sic] and the officers throw a roadblock
about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search.
The officers might be unable to show probable cause for
searching any particular car. However, I should candidly
strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in
good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a
threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.180
Writing over seventy years ago, Justice Jackson was alone in arguing that police should be given more leeway to search when the underlying offense is a vicious crime, and less leeway when the underlying
crime is less serious.181 Since then, the Court has never expressed support for Justice Jackson’s view that the amount of certainty needed for
probable cause should fluctuate based on the gravity of the offense at
issue.
Despite Justice Jackson’s failure to convince his colleagues on the
Supreme Court to adopt a fluctuating standard of probable cause, in
recent years, a growing number of prominent legal scholars have argued that the Fourth Amendment should pay attention to the underlying crime at issue. Indeed, the dominant view in legal scholarship
today appears to be that the Fourth Amendment pays too little attention to the gravity of the underlying offense as reflected in the substantive criminal law, and that in ignoring distinctions among crimes,
the Supreme Court problematically treats the Fourth Amendment as
“transsubstantive.”182
Although scholarship on this topic is sparse, most legal scholars
who have addressed the issue have argued for a sliding scale apId. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id.
182 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 843, 847 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment law is transsubstantive: it
applies the same standard to [O.J.] Simpson’s case as to the case of Lance and Susan Gates, an
Illinois couple who were charged with selling marijuana out of their house, and whose appeal
gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to define (or redefine) probable cause.”).
180
181
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proach, under which the courts would give the police more authority
to search and seize and require less certainty in terms of whether evidence of a crime will be found in the place searched when dealing with
more serious offenses than when dealing with less serious offenses.183
A few scholars have made similar arguments in the specific context of
probable cause, arguing that courts should employ a sliding scale approach to probable cause, wherein the amount of certainty required
for a finding of probable cause would decrease as the seriousness of
the crime increases.184
183 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (suggesting that crime
severity should be incorporated into Fourth Amendment doctrine); Richard Frase, What Were
They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 419–21 (2002) (noting that few scholars have recognized the importance
of considering offense severity in Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis); Eugene Volokh,
Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2004) (arguing that
“[c]onstitutional law shouldn’t be forced into unitary rules that underprotect rights when the
government interest in preventing a crime is minor, or underprotect government power when
the interest is great”); see also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1645 (1998) (suggesting that courts should find that
an “ ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the intrusiveness of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being investigated”); John Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule should not apply to certain very serious offenses unless the police action shocks the
conscience); William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations—Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U.
KAN. L. REV. 439, 557 (1990) (arguing that warrantless searches should be prohibited in investigations of nonserious crimes); Stuntz, supra note 182, at 848 (proposing that courts take “differences among crimes into account when making probable cause determinations”). Other scholars
oppose sliding scale approaches to the Fourth Amendment based upon the gravity of the crime.
See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
393–94 (1974) (arguing that adopting a sliding scale approach would convert the Fourth Amendment “into one immense Rorschach blot” and would provide little or no guidance to police);
Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1, 11–26 (1987) (providing numerous arguments against proposals for a serious
crime exception to the exclusionary rule); Kit Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Test or Rigid Rules?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 81 (2014) (noting that “the
Court has steered clear of this amorphous, ad hoc [sliding scale] approach [to probable cause],
which ‘could only produce more slide than scale’ ” (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 (1974))); see also Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51–52 (1991) (“Even
assuming that the severity of past harm can be measured in a meaningful way, the seriousness of
the crime . . . by itself, should be irrelevant to the degree of certainty police must have before
they act.”).
184 See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 YALE L.J. 1276 (2020)
(arguing that courts should embrace a pluralist view of probable cause that recognizes different
analytic methods and standards of proof in different cases); see also Bacigal, supra note 55, at
323 (arguing that “the fiction of one uniform definition of probable cause must be replaced with
a flexible sliding scale that takes account of the severity of the intrusion and the magnitude of

R

R
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PROBABLE CAUSE?

As discussed above, the Supreme Court has been terribly unclear
about how much proof is necessary for a finding of probable cause.
The only thing a majority of the Court has stated definitively in terms
of quantifying the amount of certainty needed is that probable cause
“ ‘means less than evidence which would justify condemnation’ or conviction,” but “more than bare suspicion.”185 This statement, however,
does not provide much guidance to lower courts or law enforcement
because it merely suggests that probable cause is more than a hunch
but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As Craig Lerner notes,
“[T]he Court’s statement that probable cause is more than a suspicion
and less than beyond a reasonable doubt places it somewhere between
.01% and 90%, which, when all is said and done, is not all that
helpful.”186
In 1983, a plurality of the Court provided more information as to
where probable cause lies on the spectrum of certainty of guilt. In
Texas v. Brown, a case about whether an officer’s seizure of contraband during a traffic stop fell within the plain view doctrine, Justice
Rehnquist moved the needle significantly by stating that probable
cause “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or
more likely true than false.”187 Under this definition, probable cause
does not have to rise to the level of more than fifty percent certainty,
but may constitute something less than the preponderance of the evithe threat”); see also Lerner, supra note 32, at 1014 (arguing that probable cause should be recast
within a reasonableness framework and noting that “[t]he idea that probable cause—though
famously touted as a single standard—may in fact fluctuate is not an altogether alien notion in
the case law”). Judge Richard Posner has also expressed support for a fluctuating standard of
probable cause. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Probable cause—
the area between bare suspicion and virtual certainty—describes not a point but a zone, within
which the graver the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed.”). Some scholars oppose a sliding scale approach to probable cause based upon the severity of the crime. See
Goldberg, supra note 50, at 794, 836 (arguing that the amount of certainty needed for probable
cause should not vary with the gravity of the offense and proposing instead that courts assign a
minimum percentage of certainty needed for a finding of probable cause). But see Orin Kerr,
Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 131–32 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012)
(arguing that the Court should not specify exactly how much probability constitutes a “fair”
probability sufficient for a finding of probable cause and should continue to let lower courts
intuit whether probable cause exists).
185 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348
(1813)).
186 Lerner, supra note 32, at 996.
187 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Texas v. Brown concerned the scope and
applicability of the plain view doctrine. Id. at 733 (“Because of apparent uncertainty concerning
the scope and applicability of this [plain view] doctrine, we granted certiorari.”).

R

R
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dence necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in a civil lawsuit.188 In short,
according to Justice Rehnquist’s description of probable cause in
Texas v. Brown, the amount of certainty needed for probable cause is
not much certainty at all.189
A. Lower Courts
Since 1983, hundreds of lower courts have repeated Justice Rehnquist’s statement in Texas v. Brown that probable cause does not demand a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than false,
as if this pronouncement were settled law, even though it is far from
clear that it is either correct or settled.190 Every federal Circuit Court
of Appeals, except the Third Circuit, and numerous state courts of last
resort have repeated this language.191 For example, in McReynolds v.
State,192 in explaining the meaning of probable cause, the Supreme
Court of Indiana wrote:
The Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown attempted to provide
some guidance as to when the evidentiary value is immedi188 Perhaps Justice Rehnquist was simply quantifying the way probable cause was already
understood in the federal courts. In a study conducted a few years before Texas v. Brown was
decided, federal judges were asked to assign a percentage of certainty to probable cause. The
responses indicated that the average federal judge thought that probable cause meant between
forty and fifty percent certainty. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta
of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (1982) (indicating that
52 of the 166 judges surveyed equated probable cause with a fifty percent certainty and 44 judges
equated probable cause with a forty percent certainty).
189 Thomas Davies suggests another way in which Justice Rehnquist weakened the standard
formulation of probable cause in Texas v. Brown. Just before suggesting that probable cause
does not demand a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than false, Justice Rehnquist wrote, “probable cause . . . merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’ that certain items may be contraband or
stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (emphasis
added) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S 132, 162 (1925)). Davies argues that in previous cases, including Stacey v. Emery, Carroll, and Brinegar, the Supreme Court did not use the
term “may” to describe the showing required for probable cause, but instead spoke about a
reasonable belief that a crime had in fact been committed or that an item was in fact evidence of
a crime. Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 51, 55, 56 (2010). For example, in Stacey v. Emery, applying the criminal definition of probable
cause to a customs proceeding, the Court explained that the threshold for probable cause is met
if “the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and
caution in believing that the offense has been committed.” Id. at 51 (emphasis added) (quoting
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). The Court repeated its statement from Emery in
Carroll. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161.
190 A search for lower court cases repeating this language turned up around 450 cases.
Memorandum from Stephanie Hansen to Cynthia Lee (Nov. 19, 2018) (on file with author).
191 See id.
192 460 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 1984).
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ately apparent, holding that the third requirement [of the
plain view doctrine] is met if the officer has probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity. This standard
merely require[s] “that the facts available to the officer
would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful
as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.”193
Similarly, in Williams v. Commonwealth,194 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky repeated this language from Texas v. Brown in describing
the proof necessary for a finding of probable cause as if it were settled
law:
As the United States Supreme Court has remarked, probable
cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief,” that certain items
may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence
of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief
be correct or more likely true than false.195
In Luster v. Nevada,196 the Supreme Court of Nevada repeated
this language from Texas v. Brown to explain probable cause:
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that probable cause in the context of the plain view doctrine “merely
requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items
may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence
of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief
be correct or more likely true than false.”197
Similar reliance on Texas v. Brown is found in a host of other
state supreme court opinions198 and also in the federal courts. For ex193 Id. at 963 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)).
194 147 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004).
195 Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742).
196 991 P.2d 466 (Nev. 1999).
197 Id. at 468 n.3 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. at 742).
198 See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 357 (Ala. 2013); People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 227
(Colo. 1988); Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2008); People v. Jones, 830 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ill.
2005); Wengert v. State, 771 A.2d 389, 397 (Md. 2001); People v. Custer, 630 N.W.2d 870, 879
(Mich. 2001); State v. Haselhorst, 353 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Neb. 1984); State v. Wellman, 513 A.2d 944,
948 (N.H. 1986); State v. Sinapi, 610 S.E.2d 362, 365 (N.C. 2005); State v. Flores, 996 A.2d 156,
161 (R.I. 2010); In re Care & Treatment of Chandler v. State, 676 S.E.2d 676, 680 (S.C. 2009);
State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Tenn. 1997); Pier v. State, 421 P.3d 565, 571 (Wyo. 2018).
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ample, in United States v. Jones,199 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
quoted the same language from Texas v. Brown, writing as if a majority of the Court had set forth this low threshold of certainty for probable cause:
In [Texas v.] Brown, the Court expounded upon the requirements of probable cause: [P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts
available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or
stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more
likely true than false.200
The Second Circuit did the same in United States v. BarriosMoreira,201 quoting from Texas v. Brown to explain the meaning of
probable cause:
Probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard that
“merely requires that the facts available to the officers would
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain
items may be contraband . . . or useful as evidence of a crime;
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct
or more likely true than false.”202
Similar reliance on Texas v. Brown is found in opinions from the
Fourth Circuit,203 the Fifth Circuit,204 the Sixth Circuit,205 the Seventh
Circuit,206 the Eighth Circuit,207 the Ninth Circuit,208 the Tenth Cir187 F.3d 210 (1st Cir. 1999).
Id. at 220 (emphasis added) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742).
201 872 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1989).
202 Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. at 742).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have
stated that the probable-cause standard does not require that the officer’s belief be more likely
true than false.” (citing United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 (4th Cir. 1994))); Jones, 31
F.3d at 1313 (acknowledging that Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion and stating, “The probable cause standard ‘does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely
true than false.’ ” (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
204 See, e.g., Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 821 n.22 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In defining ‘probable cause’ in [the plain view doctrine] context, the Supreme Court has observed that . . . ‘it does
not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’ ” (quoting
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
205 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 732 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that probable
cause “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false”
(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
206 See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1983).
207 See, e.g., Yost v. Solano, 955 F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Probable cause . . . ‘does not
199
200

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\88-2\GWN201.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 33

PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH

4-JUN-20

7:12

301

cuit,209 the Eleventh Circuit,210 and the D.C. Circuit.211 Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that the Supreme Court
has often said that probable cause does not demand a showing that the
officer’s belief was correct or more likely true than false:
As the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the
facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,” that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it
does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or
more likely true than false.212
While the Court has often said probable cause is a flexible common-sense standard, it has not frequently remarked that probable
cause does not require a showing that the officer’s belief be more
likely true than false.213 To the contrary, a majority of the Court has
never treated this language from Texas v. Brown as controlling, yet
the lower courts have treated Justice Rehnquist’s “not . . . more likely
true than false” definition of probable cause as settled law.
B. Legal Scholars
Not only have the lower courts treated Justice Rehnquist’s statement regarding probable cause in Texas v. Brown as settled law, a few
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’ ” (quoting
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
208 See, e.g., Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The probable
cause standard . . . ‘does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely
true than false.’ ” (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
209 See, e.g., United States v. Alderete, 753 F. App’x 617, 622 (10th Cir. 2018) (“While
probable cause is difficult to quantify, the Supreme Court has held that probable cause ‘does not
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.’ ” (quoting
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 324 F. App’x 800, 804 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that
probable cause “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true
than false” (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
211 See, e.g., Dukore v. District of Columbia, 799 F.3d 1137, 1142 (2015) (“The probable
cause standard does ‘not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true
than false.’ ” (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742)).
212 United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). Brinegar, however, was decided in 1949,
more than thirty years before Texas v. Brown, and the Court in Brinegar did not define probable
cause as not more likely true than false.
213 Memorandum from Casey Matsumoto to Cynthia Lee, March 29, 2020 (describing research into whether the Supreme Court has repeated this language and noting that this language
has been repeated only once by Justice Powell, dissenting in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987)) (on file with author).
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prominent legal scholars have repeated this language as if it were settled law. For example, in explaining the probable cause standard for
arrests, Kent Greenawalt has noted:
The “probable cause” standard for arrests and seizures is not
one of absolute certainty. In actual application by law enforcement officers and judges, the seriousness of the crime
and concern about escape from the jurisdiction are likely to
play a role in what probability is seen as necessary. However,
in one standard formulation by the Supreme Court, probable
cause for an arrest was present when officers had “knowledge” and “reasonably trustworthy information” of “facts
and circumstances . . . sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been or is being committed.” This imprecise language standard suggests a likelihood approximating “more probable
than not,” although the Court has specifically stated that
probable cause “does not demand any showing that such a
belief be correct or more likely true than false.”214
Similarly, in examining the meaning of probable cause to arrest,
Sherry Colb has explained:
[T]he probable-cause standard “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.”
Though some of the cases are relatively old, the Court has
not subsequently retreated from the position—however obliquely stated—that probable cause is something more than
bare suspicion but something less than “more probable than
not.”215

214 Kent Greenawalt, Probabilities, Perceptions, Consequences and “Discrimination”: One
Puzzle About Controversial “Stop and Frisk,” 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 181, 185–86 (2014) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
215 Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete
Harms, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 72 (2010) (emphasis added) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. at 742). Other legal scholars have recognized that Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion.
See Bacigal, supra note 55, at 289 (noting that Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion and that
“[a] majority of the Court has never explicitly held that probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence”); Goldberg, supra note 50, at 801 n.62 (“A plurality of the Supreme Court
has stated that the probable cause standard ‘does not demand any showing that such a belief [of
criminal wrongdoing] be correct or more likely true than false.’ ”); Arnold H. Loewy, Protecting
Citizens From Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C. L. REV. 329, 340 n.66 (1984) (noting that
Texas v. Brown was a plurality opinion).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\88-2\GWN201.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 35

4-JUN-20

PROBABLE CAUSE WITH TEETH

7:12

303

III. WHY LOWER COURTS SHOULD NOT FOLLOW JUSTICE
REHNQUIST’S COMMENT ON THE MEANING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE IN TEXAS V. BROWN
Lower courts should not follow Justice Rehnquist’s statement on
probable cause in Texas v. Brown for several reasons. First, Texas v.
Brown was just a plurality opinion and Justice Rehnquist’s definition
of probable cause was not necessary or essential to the judgment in
the case. Second, Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion that probable cause
can be satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence is misguided as a matter of history, precedent, and logic. Third,
setting the bar for probable cause so low exacerbates the racial disparity in arrest patterns that already exists today.
A. Texas v. Brown was Just a Plurality Opinion and Justice
Rehnquist’s Description of Probable Cause Was Not
Necessary to the Judgment
First, lower courts should not follow Justice Rehnquist’s description of probable cause because Texas v. Brown was just a plurality
opinion. In 1983, Justice Rehnquist was only able to get three other
Justices to sign onto his opinion.216 Not only was Texas v. Brown just a
plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist’s statement on the showing necessary for a finding of probable cause was not necessary to the judgment. As James F. Spriggs II and David R. Stras explain, a plurality
decision is one in which “a majority of Justices agree upon the result
or judgment in a case but fail to agree upon a single rationale in support of the judgment.”217 Importantly, “an opinion concurring in the
judgment is the functional equivalent of a dissent from the plurality’s
reasoning even if it represents agreement with the result reached in
the case.”218
It is widely agreed that a plurality opinion “carr[ies] less precedential weight”219 than a majority opinion because a plurality opinion
“represents nothing more than the views of the individual justices who
216

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 732.

James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515,
517 (2011).
217

Id. at 520.
John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62; see also Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit
Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 35 (2009) (finding
that lower courts are less likely to treat a plurality decision positively and more likely to treat
that decision negatively or neutrally).
218
219
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join in the opinion.”220 Just how much less precedential weight, however, is a matter of disagreement.221
In Marks v. United States,222 the Supreme Court sought to provide
guidance to lower courts with respect to splintered Supreme Court
decisions, setting forth the following rule of thumb:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
“the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds . . . .”223
Marks was a short opinion and seemed to offer a simple resolution to the problem of deciding which opinion to follow when there is
a plurality opinion and opinions concurring in the judgment of the
plurality but offering different rationales for that judgment, but it has
proven difficult to apply in practice.224 For example, lower courts have
not been able to agree on which opinion to follow in Missouri v. Seibert,225 a Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionally of a twostage police interrogation strategy known as “question first, warn
later.”226 Under this strategy, police officers would deliberately neglect to give a suspect in custody the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona227 prior to an initial custodial interrogation, in the hopes of
obtaining a confession.228 After obtaining the desired confession, the
police would give the Miranda warnings and interrogate the suspect
again, getting the suspect to repeat the earlier confession.229 At trial,
the government would concede that the first unwarned confession was
Davis & Reynolds, supra note 219, at 61.
Some have argued that only the result of the plurality decision, and not the legal reasoning on which the decision was based, should be treated as binding. Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 823 (2017).
Others have suggested that lower courts should “give precedential effect to at least some aspects
of the reasoning through which the precedent-setting court arrived at its decision.” Id. at 824.
Yet others have suggested that lower courts should follow both the specific result in a plurality
opinion and the “broader rule or rationale that the precedent court articulated in explaining that
result.” Id. at 824–25.
222 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
223 Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
224 Spriggs & Stras, supra note 217, at 568 (noting that the Marks rule is “notoriously difficult to apply”). Even the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the Marks rule has “baffled” lower courts trying to apply it. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
225 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
226 Id. at 605–06.
227 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
228 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605–06.
229 See id.
220

R

221

R
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inadmissible, but argue that the second warned confession should be
admitted into evidence because the police gave the suspect the required Miranda warnings prior to obtaining that second confession.230
Writing for a plurality of the Court in Seibert, Justice Souter ruled
that the subsequent warned confession following an earlier unwarned
confession had to be thrown out.231 According to Justice Souter, in
two-stage interrogation cases, the proper test to apply asks whether it
would be reasonable to find that the Miranda warnings could function
“effectively” under the circumstances.232 That is, “Could the warnings
effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an
admissible statement at that juncture? Could they reasonably convey
that he could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier?”233
Justice Souter expressly declined to apply a “fruit of the poisonous
tree” analysis, noting that the Court had rejected this type of analysis
in a previous case involving a two-stage interrogation.234 Additionally,
the officer’s intent is irrelevant under Justice Souter’s test.235
Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s opinion, but wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested the proper approach in
a two-stage interrogation case was not to ask whether the Miranda
warnings functioned effectively, but rather to treat the initial failure to
warn—the Miranda violation—as a constitutional violation and apply
a fruit of the poisonous tree analysis to that Miranda violation.236 As
Justice Breyer explained, “Courts should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the
initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good
faith.”237 Under Justice Breyer’s test, the subsequent warned confession would constitute tainted “fruit” of the initial Miranda violation
and would thus be inadmissible unless the initial failure to warn was in
good faith, that is, not deliberately done to get a confession.238
Justice Breyer noted that he believed the plurality’s test “in practice [would] function as a ‘fruits’ test” because the only time a court
would conclude that the Miranda warnings functioned effectively
would be when “certain circumstances—a lapse in time, a change in
location or interrogating officer, or a shift in the focus of the question230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

See id. at 614.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 611–12.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 612 n.4 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985)).
Id. at 616 n.6.
Id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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ing—intervene between the unwarned questioning and any postwarning statement.”239
Justice Breyer’s test, however, differed from the plurality’s test in
two significant ways. First, the intent of the officer would matter under
Justice Breyer’s test, but not under the plurality’s test. Justice Breyer’s
test would exclude the subsequent confession unless the failure to
warn was in good faith and not deliberate.240 Justice Souter did not
carve out such a good faith exception, noting that “the intent of the
officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here.”241 Second,
Justice Breyer’s test would apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and treat the initial failure to warn as a constitutional violation,242 whereas Justice Souter’s test explicitly rejected a fruits analysis
and refused to treat a Miranda violation as a constitutional
violation.243
Justice Kennedy did not join Justice Souter’s plurality opinion but
concurred in the plurality’s judgment. Like Justice Breyer, Justice
Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he proposed a
test that, unlike the plurality’s test, turned on whether the initial failure to warn was deliberate.244 Under Justice Kennedy’s test, if the initial failure to warn was deliberate, then not only would the initial
confession be inadmissible as a violation of the Miranda rule, but the
subsequent warned confession would also be inadmissible unless the
police took specific curative measures to rectify the initial failure to
warn.245 Justice Kennedy provided specific examples of measures that
could be considered curative by the court, including “a substantial
break in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement
and the Miranda warning” and explaining to the suspect that her first
Id.
Id.
241 Id. at 616 n.6 (majority opinion).
242 Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
243 Id. at 612 n.4 (majority opinion).
244 Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although I agree with much in the careful and
convincing opinion for the plurality, my approach does differ in some respects, requiring this
separate statement.”). Justice Kennedy took pains to distinguish Ms. Seibert’s case from Oregon
v. Elstad, a case in which the police officer’s initial failure to warn was inadvertent. Id. at 620.
According to Justice Kennedy, “This case presents different considerations. The police [in this
case] used a two-step questioning technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda. The
Miranda warning was withheld to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition when finally given.” Id.
239
240

245 Id. at 621 (“When an interrogator uses this deliberate, two-step strategy, predicated
upon violating Miranda during an extended interview, postwarning statements that are related to
the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded absent specific, curative steps.”).
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confession likely could not be used against her in court.246 Since no
such curative steps were taken in this case, Justice Kennedy agreed
with the plurality that Seibert’s post-warning statements were inadmissible and her conviction could not stand.247
According to Charles Weisselberg, at least six federal circuits
have chosen to follow Justice Kennedy’s approach, asking first
whether the violation of Miranda was deliberate, and if so, whether
curative measures were taken.248 Other circuits either combine aspects
of the plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s test or have declined to
decide which controls.249
Presumably the lower courts are following Justice Kennedy’s curative measures test because they believe his test is the narrowest offered by the different opinions in Seibert, thus satisfying the Marks
standard that “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.”250 At first glance, it may appear that Justice Kennedy’s curative measures test is narrower than Justice Souter’s test
since it applies only to two-stage interrogations where the officer’s
failure to warn is a deliberate tactical choice,251 whereas Justice Souter’s test applies to all two-stage interrogations regardless of the officer’s intent.252
The problem is that if we count up the votes, all of the Justices
except Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer opposed a test that turns
on the officer’s subjective intent. Justice Souter was careful to note in
his plurality opinion that in two-stage interrogation cases, courts
should focus on the facts of the case rather than on the intent of the
officer.253 While the four dissenting Justices—Justice O’Connor, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—did not sign
onto Justice Souter’s proposed test, they agreed with Justice Souter
that the analysis should not focus on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer.254 Following Justice Kennedy’s approach would there246

Id. at 622.

247

Id.

248

Charles Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1551 (2008).

249

See id.

250

See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).

251

Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

252

Id. at 616 n.6 (majority opinion).

253

See id.

Id. at 623 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “the plurality correctly declines to
focus its analysis on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer”).
254
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fore be following an approach that was rejected by seven of the nine
Justices.255
As illustrated by the Court’s Seibert decision, lower courts generally follow the judgment of a plurality opinion and treat it as precedent, though they do not always follow the reasoning of the plurality
opinion or even tests proposed in the plurality opinion. Through
Marks, the Supreme Court has given lower courts the green light to
follow the reasoning of a concurring opinion rather than the plurality
opinion.256
Turning back to Texas v. Brown, what all this means is that while
lower courts may justifiably follow the judgment of Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, which was a finding that
the seizure at hand met the requirements of the plain view doctrine,
they need not and should not follow Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of probable cause as requiring less than a preponderance of the
evidence because this comment was not agreed on by a majority of the
Court.257 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred only in
See Wiesselberg, supra note 248, at 1551.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
257 Separate from the fact that Texas v. Brown was only a plurality opinion and therefore
not entitled to the full precedential weight afforded to majority Court opinions, Justice Rehnquist’s definition of probable cause was not necessary to the judgment in the case. One might
even argue that Justice Rehnquist’s comment defining probable cause was merely dicta and
therefore is not controlling. It is well settled that dicta is “not controlling.” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935). While judges often suggest that distinguishing
between holdings and dicta is a “routine, noncontroversial matter,” Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (1994), courts and legal scholars have struggled for
years to distinguish dicta from holdings in a way that is easy to understand and apply. Most seem
to follow the necessity model under which dicta or “obiter dictum” is defined as “[a] judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential.” Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) (emphasis added); see also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 161
(2d ed. 1921) (stating that for a holding to have precedential weight, “it must be, in the first
place, an opinion given by a judge, and, in the second place, it must be an opinion the formation
of which is necessary for the decision of a particular case; in other words, it must not be obiter
dictum”) (emphasis added); KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 203 (2013) (defining “mere dicta” as “comments within opinions that are peripheral to
what the case is about”). Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns suggest an alternative way
of distinguishing holdings from dicta. Under their approach, “[a] holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided,
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.” Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta,
57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1065 (2005). Under either of these definitions, Justice Rehnquist’s comment about probable cause not needing to be more likely true than false arguably qualifies as
dicta. Under the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of dicta, Justice Rehnquist’s comment qualifies as dicta because it was a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but was
unnecessary to the decision in the case. Under the Abramowicz and Stearns definition of dicta,
255
256

R
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the judgment, agreeing that the seizure in that case met the requirements for a plain view seizure, but refused to join Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion because he felt that Justice Rehnquist’s critique of another
Supreme Court decision, Coolidge v. New Hampshire,258 went too
far.259 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,
also concurred only in the judgment and refused to join Justice Rehnquist’s opinion because he felt that the plurality gave “inadequate
consideration” to Supreme Court precedent on the container doctrine.260 These five Justices expressly refused to join anything other
than the plurality’s judgment that the seizure in question satisfied the
requirements of the plain view doctrine.261
Tellingly, Justice Rehnquist did not rest his probable cause finding on a conclusion that the officer’s belief that there was contraband
in the balloon was more likely true than false.262 He did not ask
whether the officer’s belief that there was contraband in the balloon
was more likely true than false. He simply concluded that “it is plain
Justice Rehnquist’s comment could also qualify as dicta because it did not lead to the judgment.
Justice Rehnquist did not apply his not more likely true than false standard when evaluating
whether the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon in question contained contraband.
He simply concluded that “it is plain” that the officer had the probable cause. Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Moreover, the issue before the Court was whether the “immediately
apparent” requirement of the plain view doctrine requires that the officer know he is viewing
contraband or evidence of a crime, or whether probable cause is sufficient to satisfy the immediately apparent requirement, not how much certainty is required for a finding of probable cause.
Id. at 741–42. The Court of Criminal Appeals had suggested that the officer “had to know that
‘incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized the balloon.’ ” Id. at 735. Three judges
below had dissented on the ground that the officer just needed probable cause. Id. Another
reason to view Justice Rehnquist’s not more likely true than false definition of probable cause as
dicta is that under the facts of the case, a strong argument can be made that there was more than
a fifty percent likelihood that the balloon contained drugs. The officer did not merely observe a
green balloon. He also saw some “small plastic vials” and “loose white powder.” Id. at 734. A
minority of courts follow what Chaz (Charles) Tyler calls the “adjudicative model” rather than
the “necessity model” to distinguish holdings from dicta. Under the adjudicative model, “the key
question is whether an issue has been ruled on (adjudicated), not whether that ruling was necessary.” Charles W. Tyler, The Adjudicative Model of Precedent, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (draft at 5) (describing the “adjudicative model” of distinguishing holdings from dicta used
by the Ninth Circuit and state courts in Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota, under which
a holding is “any ruling expressly resolving an issue that was part of the earlier case”). Under the
adjudicative model, Justice Rehnquist’s not more likely true than false comment on probable
cause could be called a holding, rather than mere dicta, even though it was not necessary to the
judgment, as long as probable cause was an issue before the courts below.
258 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
259 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 744 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I do not join the plurality’s
opinion because it goes well beyond the application of the [plain view] exception.”).
260 Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring).
261 See id. at 744 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring).
262 See id. at 742–43.
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that Officer Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon in Brown’s hand contained an illicit substance,” given the officer’s experience as a narcotics detective.263
B. Justice Rehnquist’s View of Probable Cause is Misguided as a
Matter of History, Precedent, and Logic
A second reason lower courts should reject Justice Rehnquist’s
statement that probable cause does not demand any showing that the
officer’s belief “be . . . more likely true than false”264 is that this understanding of probable cause is misguided as a matter of history, precedent, and logic.
1. History
One of the Framers’ main goals in including the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights was ensuring that the police did not have
unconstrained power to search and seize.265 As Thomas Davies explains, the Fourth Amendment was primarily a response to the English monarchy’s use of general warrants to conduct revenue searches
of houses.266 Accordingly, at the time of the framing, bare probable
cause that a crime had likely been committed was not sufficient to
justify an arrest, whether with or without a warrant.267 According to
Id. at 742.
Id.
265 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of
this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”); see also WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602, 767
(2009) (“By requiring that all warrants be specific and by abrogating multiple categories of
search and seizure, the framers of the amendment hoped to shield the people, not just their
houses, from all unreasonable searches and seizures by the federal government.”); Thomas K.
Clancy, The Purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Crafting Rules to Implement That Purpose,
48 U. RICH. L. REV. 479, 522 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment was designed by the framers to
protect individuals from the government.”); David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding:
Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 230 (2005) (“Historical
sources indicate that the framers were focused on a single, narrow problem—physical invasions
of houses by government agents. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to address this problem
with a precise, bright-line rule. Before entering a house, law enforcement officers typically would
need to obtain a specific warrant.”); David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2004) (“A review of history demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment was intended to proscribe only a single, discrete activity—
physical searches of houses pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all.”).
266 Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 4 (2010).
267 Id. at 11.
263
264
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Davies, an arrest was justified only if there was (1) “a sworn accusation” that a crime had in fact been committed, and (2) probable cause
as to the identity of the culprit.268
This common law standard for probable cause was much more
stringent than the standard that applies today and was a product of
the arbitrary arrests that were “a salient historical abuse of criminaljustice power in English constitutional history.”269 Allowing the police
to arrest persons based on less than a fifty percent certainty that the
arrestee is involved in criminal activity gives the police virtually unconstrained arrest power similar to the power accorded law enforcement in England prior to the founding. This is a far cry from what the
Framers of our Constitution wanted.
Although looking to history reveals clear justification to reject
Justice Rehnquist’s standard, it is important to recognize how difficult
it is to accurately determine this history, and not depend solely on
history to reject Justice Rehnquist’s musings on probable cause in
Texas v. Brown.270 As David Sklansky notes, one problem with what
Id.
Id.
270 Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 347 (2002) (“Even if one believes that
adherence to the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment serves the important goals of limiting judicial discretion and making the law more predictable, can these benefits be achieved with
any regularity, given the difficulty of accurately determining common-law rules and applying
them in a modern context?”). An example of the difficulty of ascertaining applicable common
law is illustrated by Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, in which the Court was asked to rule on the
constitutionality of allowing an officer with probable cause to believe that a minor fine-only
offense had taken place to effectuate a custodial arrest. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Gail Atwater was
pulled over by a police officer for driving without a seat belt and failing to secure her young
children in their seatbelts. Id. at 323–24. Driving without a seatbelt was a minor traffic violation
punishable by a maximum fine of fifty dollars. Id. at 323. Even though the seatbelt offense for
which Atwater was pulled over was a fine-only offense and the officer could have simply issued
her a traffic citation, he handcuffed Atwater with her hands behind her back—a tactic usually
used when an officer fears that a suspect poses some physical threat—arrested her, and took her
to the police station where she was booked and placed in a jail cell for approximately an hour
before being taken before a magistrate. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 382–83 (5th
Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc granted, 171 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999). Atwater entered a plea of no
contest to the seatbelt charges. Id. at 383. After this incident, Atwater and her husband brought
a federal civil rights lawsuit against the city of Lago Vista, the Police Chief, and the arresting
officer, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Id. Before the
Supreme Court, Atwater argued that “ ‘founding-era common-law rules’ forbade peace officers
to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of ‘breach of the peace,’ a category she
claim[ed] was then understood narrowly as covering only those nonfelony offenses ‘involving or
tending toward violence.’ ” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 327. The Court rejected Atwater’s argument
because it found that common law authorities were not consistent as to what was required for a
lawful custodial arrest. Id. at 332. Justice Souter explained that on the issue of “officers’ warrantless misdemeanor arrest power,” the relevant “ ‘founding-era common-law rules’ were not nearly
268
269
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he calls Justice Scalia’s “new Fourth Amendment originalism”—the
idea that courts should look at early common law precedents and ask
whether the government action in question constituted a search at the
time of the framing to determine whether such action constitutes a
search today—is that it is often difficult to determine what was required at early common law either because there are no early common law decisions on point or the early common law precedents that
do exist are inconsistent.271 Inconsistent precedent allows judges to
pick and choose the precedent that suits them.272
2. Precedent
Another reason to reject the view that probable cause means
something less than a preponderance of the evidence is precedent.
While the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on probable cause have
not been a model of clarity, the idea that probable cause is something
less than a preponderance of the evidence has never commanded a
majority of the Court—neither before Texas v. Brown nor after. The
Court instead has consistently declined to assign a specific percentage
to the concept of probable cause, explaining:
More recently, we said that ‘the quanta . . . of proof’ appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the
decision to issue a warrant. Finely tuned standards such as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of
the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the
magistrate’s decision. While an effort to fix some general,
numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to
‘probable cause’ may not be helpful, it is clear that ‘only the
as clear as Atwater claims” and, in fact, “reached divergent conclusions.” Id. at 327–28. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment below, finding that the arresting officer had probable
cause to believe Atwater had violated the seat belt laws and acted reasonably when he arrested
her and took her into custody. Id. at 354. But see Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of
Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246 (2002) (critiquing
Justice Souter’s historical analysis in Atwater). Richard Frase makes the further point that even if
the common law rules had been clearer, “it would have been (and was) a mistake to give these
ancient rules controlling weight in a case like Atwater” because so much has changed in American society since the Founding era. Frase, supra at 345.
271

Id. at 1794–96, 1806.

Id. at 1794. Sklansky points out that in Wyoming v. Houghton, the very first case in
which the full Court embraced Justice Scalia’s new Fourth Amendment originalism, “[s]trictly
speaking, no ‘18th-century common law’ was found applicable by the Court,” which led the
majority to rely, not on common law, but on federal legislation from that time period. Id. at
1760.
272
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probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’273
It may be that in rejecting the view that probable cause requires a
specific quantum of evidence—like a preponderance of the evidence
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt—the Court has simply not
wanted to lock itself into quantifying the meaning of probable cause,
leaving the ultimate decision as to whether there is probable cause to
the magistrate judge deciding whether to issue a warrant. Whatever its
reasons, a majority of the Court has never repeated Justice Rehnquist’s statement that probable cause means something less than a
preponderance of the evidence. Instead, it has time and again suggested that probable cause simply means something beyond a mere
suspicion and something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.274
3. Logic
Yet another reason to reject the notion that probable cause
means something less than a preponderance of the evidence is logic. It
makes no sense to say that probable cause deals with probabilities,
and then say that probable cause does not have to be more likely than
not. If you ask someone, “Do you think it is going to rain tomorrow?”
and they reply, “Yes, I think there is a fair probability that it will rain
tomorrow” or “Yes, I have reasonable grounds to believe that it will
rain tomorrow,” in other words, “I think there is probable cause that
it will rain tomorrow,” it would not make sense for the person to then
add, “and I think the likelihood of rain is less than fifty percent.” Similarly, when a police officer says, “I have probable cause to arrest Joe,”
the officer is suggesting there is a fair probability or reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that Joe committed it. It simply does not make sense for the officer to then say,
“and I think there is less than a fifty percent chance that Joe committed that crime.”
Moreover, if we look to other areas of the law where probable
cause is the standard, such as in the grand jury context, we see that
probable cause is generally understood to mean that “the person be273 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
419 (1969); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949)).
274 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (repeating this language from
Brinegar); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (“Evidence required to establish guilt
is not necessary. On the other hand, good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.
Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man
in believing that the offense has been committed.”).
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ing investigated is probably guilty.”275 A grand jury needs probable
cause to issue an indictment,276 but probable cause in the grand jury
context has a more robust meaning than Justice Rehnquist’s understanding of probable cause in Texas v. Brown. The Model Grand Jury
Charge instructs grand jurors as follows:
25. To return an indictment charging an individual with an
offense, it is not necessary that you find that individual guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. You are not a trial jury and your
task is not to decide the guilt or innocence of the person
charged. Your task is to determine whether the government’s
evidence as presented to you is sufficient to cause you to
conclude that there is probable cause to believe that the person being investigated committed the offense charged. To
put it another way, you should vote to indict where the evidence presented to you is sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable person’s belief that the person being investigated is
probably guilty of the offense charged.277
Many jurisdictions have adopted the same or similar instructions
to those that appear in the Model Grand Jury Charge.278 Some jurisdictions go even further and instruct their grand jurors that they
275 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Section 7.04: Grand Jury Selection and Instructions,
BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (Mar. 2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/2014/Benchbook-US-District-Judges-6TH-FJC-MAR-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7AVU6SF] (emphasis added).
276 See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1097 (2014) (noting that the “Court has
often recognized the grand jury’s singular role in finding the probable cause necessary to initiate
a prosecution for a serious crime” (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956))).
277 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 275. The Model Grand Jury Charge is approved
by the Judicial Conference of the United States, see MODEL GRAND JURY CHARGE (JUD. CONF.
OF U.S. 2005), to whom Congress has granted authority to “adopt rules and regulations governing [grand jury procedure].” 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2018).
278 Id. at 1197 (noting that a “majority of the states have adopted instructions similar to the
federal model instructions”). Alabama’s model grand jury instructions differ from the Model
Grand Jury Charge by instructing grand jurors that they must indict if they find probable cause
to believe the target has committed a felony. See General Jury Instructions, ALA. JUDICIAL SYS.,
(adopted Nov. 13, 2014), http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/docs/General_Jury_Instruc
tions.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK2L-UYRB] (instructing that, “[a]s to felonies, whenever the legal
evidence received by a Grand Jury establishes probable cause to believe that a felony has been
committed and that a particular person has committed that offense, then the Grand Jury must
return a true bill of indictment”). In contrast, some states tell their grand jurors that they may
indict if they find probable cause. See, e.g., Grand Jury Impanelment Instruction, N.Y. UNIFIED
CT. SYS., (revised June 2019), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/5-SampleCharges/
CJI2d.Grand-Jury_Rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/35X9-N92K] (instructing that a grand jury “may indict a person for an offense . . . when the evidence presented is legally sufficient” to establish
that the person committed the offense, and “provides reasonable cause to believe that the person in fact committed the offense”).

R
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should not return an indictment “unless the government’s evidence
would lead them to convict the accused at trial.”279
C. Lowering the Threshold of Certainty for Probable Cause Allows
for More Arbitrary Arrests and Exacerbates a Preexisting Problem of Racial Disparity in Arrests
Finally, Justice Rehnquist’s very low threshold of certainty for
probable cause gives the police broad discretion to arrest individuals
who may or may not be involved in criminal activity, exacerbating a
pre-existing problem of racial disparity in arrests. Whether because of
explicit or implicit racial bias in the persons who call the police or the
arresting officers themselves, police officers often arrest black individuals in situations where they would not have arrested a white individual behaving the same way.
For example, one afternoon in April 2018, two African American
men entered a Starbucks in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to meet someone for a business meeting.280 Immediately upon walking into the
store, one of the men asked an employee, who happened to be the
manager of that store, for the code to the bathroom.281 The manager
told him that the restrooms were only for paying customers and the
two men proceeded to sit at a table.282 A few seconds later, the manager approached the men and asked if she could get them any
drinks.283 The men declined since they had bottles of water with them,
and told her they were waiting for another person.284 The manager
asked the men to leave the store, and when they refused, she called
279 Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to
Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 486 (1980). Other jurisdictions
simply equate probable cause to indict with probable cause to arrest. Id. at 485–86 (citing U.S.
Department of Justice Materials Relating to Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 CRIM. L. REP. 3001, 3002
(BNA 1978) (treating the probable cause standard for a grand jury indictment the same as the
probable cause standard for an arrest)).
280 Rachel Siegel, Men Arrested at Starbucks Describe Surprise, Fear, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
2018, at A14.
281 Id.; see also Ben Shapiro, That Philly Starbucks Has Several Cameras. So Why Won’t
They Release Tape of a Racist Incident?, DAILY WIRE (Apr. 19, 2018), https://
www.dailywire.com/news/29642/philly-starbucks-has-several-cameras-so-why-wont-ben-shapiro
[https://perma.cc/QB6J-3YQJ].
282 Siegel, Men Arrested at Starbucks Describe Surprise, Fear, supra note 280 (noting that
the manager told Nelson that the restrooms were for paying customers only, and Nelson “just
left it at that”).
283

Id.

284

Id.

R
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911 and told the police that two men were in the store and that they
had declined to leave despite not making a purchase.285
At 4:41 PM, approximately six minutes after the men walked into
the store, two police officers arrived and told the men they had to
leave.286 When the men did not get up, the officers handcuffed and
arrested them and, without reading them any rights or telling them
why they were being arrested, took them into custody for trespassing
and causing a disturbance.287 During the arrest, which was caught on
cell phone video,288 the man with whom the two African American
men planned to meet arrived and asked the officers why the men were
being arrested.289 On the video, that man, who is white, can be heard
telling the officers that the two men were there to meet him.290 The
officers, however, refused to release the men and took them to the
police station for booking.291
The video of the arrest went viral, and amidst public outrage and
charges of racial profiling, the Chief Executive Officer of Starbucks,
Kevin Johnson, apologized to the two men.292 Howard Schultz, Execu285 Id. (noting that the manager called the police just two minutes after the two African
American men arrived at the Starbucks store). According to news reports of this incident, the
manager was acting pursuant to store guidelines that required managers to ask nonpaying customers to leave the store and call police if they refuse. Rachel Siegel, Starbucks Chairman Says
Manager Showed ‘Unconscious Bias’ in Calling 911, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2018, at A14; see also
Jenny Gathright & Emily Sullivan, Starbucks, Police And Mayor Respond To Controversial Arrest of 2 Black Men In Philly, NPR, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/14/
602556973/starbucks-police-and-mayor-weigh-in-on-controversial-arrest-of-2-black-men-in-ph
[https://perma.cc/4WQB-ZVEW].
286 Siegel, Men Arrested at Starbucks Describe Surprise, Fear, supra note 280.
287 Id.; see also Elizabeth Dias, John Eligon & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Philadelphia Starbucks
Arrests, Outrageous to Some, Are Everyday Life for Others, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/us/starbucks-arrest-philadelphia.html [https://perma.cc/B9Y9HPHX].
288 See Rachel Siegel & Alex Horton, Starbucks CEO Calls for Bias Training, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 2018, at A2 (noting that “[a]t least two videos captured the tense moment when at least
six Philadelphia police officers stood over two seated black men, asking them to leave”).
289 Outrage Grows Over Video Showing Two Black Men Arrested at Philadelphia
Starbucks, NBC 10 (Apr. 14, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Out
rage-Over-Video-Showing-Two-Black-Men-Arrested-at-Philadelphia-Starbucks-479771543.html
[https://perma.cc/A7YS-9EZ7].
290 Id.
291 See Dias et al., supra note 287; see also Alex Horton, Starbucks CEO apologizes after
employee calls police on black men waiting at a table, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/14/starbucks-apologizes-after-employee-calls-police-on-black-men-waiting-at-a-table/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.708b6a0c96d2 [https://perma
.cc/DRR9-BW4R] (reporting that, according to their attorney, an officer at the police station
suggested to the men that they faced charges for “defiant trespassing”).
292 Rachel Siegel, Starbucks Chairman Says Manager Showed ‘Unconscious Bias’ in Calling
911, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2018, at A14.
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tive Chairman of Starbucks at the time, acknowledged that the
Starbucks manager probably acted from unconscious bias when she
decided to call the police.293 In addition, Starbucks closed more than
8,000 of its stores the month after the incident so its employees could
undergo racial bias training.294 Within a few weeks, the two African
American men who were arrested at the Philadelphia Starbucks store
reached a settlement with the city of Philadelphia, which agreed to
pay them $1 each, help them take courses to complete their bachelor’s
degrees, and fund a $200,000 program to help high school students
aspiring to be entrepreneurs.295
Far from being an isolated incident, about the same time as the
Starbucks incident, police in cities and states across the nation were
called to investigate other African Americans who were doing things
that ordinarily do not trigger 911 calls.296 For example, on April 21,
293 See id. When asked about the arrest of the two African American men at the Philadelphia Starbucks store, Schultz spoke about the decision to close all Starbucks stores in May 2018
so all Starbucks employees could undergo implicit bias training. See Gregory Krieg & Vanessa
Yurkevich, Schultz’s Claim He Doesn’t ‘See Color’ at Odds with Starbucks’ 2018 Anti-bias Training Videos, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019) https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/howard-schultzstarbucks-racial-bias-training-videos/index.html [https://perma.cc/5ZDT-2YHP]. Interestingly,
Howard Schultz revealed his own unconscious racial bias at a CNN Town Hall in February 2019
when he remarked that he doesn’t “see color.” See id. (“I didn’t see color as a young boy, and I
honestly don’t see color now.”). One who claims not to see race or color is simply denying the
existence of implicit bias. All of us, including those of us who are egalitarian-minded and progressive, are influenced by racial and other stereotypes. See Anastasia M. Boles, The Culturally
Proficient Law Professor: Beginning the Journey, 48 N.M. L. REV. 145, 168 (2018) (“When a
microaggressor comments ‘I don’t see color,’ the hidden message is ‘I do not recognize your
unique cultural experience and background,’ not ‘I am not racist.’ ” (quoting DERALD WING
SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 32
(2010)); Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness as
Property and Racial Performance as Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 7, 10,
30 (2015); see also Ellen Yaroshefsky, Waiting for the Elevator: Talking About Race, 27 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1203, 1212–13 (2014).
294 Tracy Jan & Rachel Siegel, Race Training to Briefly Close Starbucks Shops, WASH.
POST, Apr. 18, 2018, at A22; see also Christine Emba, Opinion, Starbucks’s Small Step Still Sets
an Example, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2018, at A17 (noting that “Starbucks’s decision to shut down
its stores on May 29 for a day of ‘racial-bias education’ training may not be enough to contain
the backlash building against it” but that in doing this, “Starbucks is setting an unusually good
example of what should be done when racism becomes a public problem in a public space.”).
295 Rachel Siegel, Two Black Men Arrested at Starbucks Settle with Philadelphia for $1
Each, WASH. POST (May 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/
02/african-american-men-arrested-at-starbucks-reach-1-settlement-with-the-city-secure-promisefor-200000-grant-program-for-young-entrepreneurs/?utm_term=.a602a3b4a02f [https://perma.cc/
BM5L-9A75].
296 See Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1717–19
(2019) (discussing numerous cases where white people called the police to report black people
doing normal things, and arguing that these people were, in essence, “using the police to discipline Black people” found in spaces typically occupied by whites).
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2018, five African American women were golfing at a golf course in a
largely white suburban area in York County, Pennsylvania, when they
were approached by a man claiming to be affiliated with the club, who
told the women that they were not keeping a quick enough pace and
needed to leave.297 The man told the women, “You’re going too slow.
I’ll give you a refund[.]”298 One of the women replied, “Do you realize
we’re the only black women on this course, and you’re only coming up
to us? We paid, we want to play.”299 The man walked off in a huff.300
Three of the women left before finishing the round because they were
so shaken by the confrontation,301 but two of the women stayed and
were about to start a second round of golf when they were approached again, this time by one of the club’s owners and other employees, who told them that they had five minutes to leave and that
the police had been called.302 The women were also offered checks to
refund their memberships.303 The police arrived, but decided that
charges were not warranted and did not arrest the women.304
In another incident around the same time, Lolade Siyonbola, a
black graduate student, was napping at around 1:30 AM in the common area of her dormitory at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, when a white student confronted her.305 The white student
turned on the lights and said, “Is there someone in here? Is there
someone sleeping in here? You’re not supposed to be here.”306 The
white student then called campus police.307 When campus police arrived, Siyonbola told them that she was a student at Yale and used her
room key to open the door to her dorm room.308 Campus police, how297 Christina Caron, 5 Black Women Were Told to Golf Faster. Then the Club Called the
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/black-women-golfers-york.html [https://perma.cc/R98G-NFL2]; Rachel Siegel, Pa. Golf Club Calls Police after
Telling 5 Black Women They Were Playing Too Slowly, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 24, 2018, 1:42 PM),
https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180424/pa-golf-club-calls-police-after-telling-5-black
-women-they-were-playing-too-slowly [https://perma.cc/T22D-UZXG].
298 Siegel, supra note 297.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.; see Caron, supra note 297.
303 Siegel, supra note 297.
304 Id.
305 Siyonbola had been working on a paper and fell asleep in the common area of her
dormitory. Tariro Mzezewa, Napping While Black (and Other Transgressions), N.Y. TIMES (May
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/opinion/yale-napping-racism-black.html [https://
perma.cc/55H7-R4EV].
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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ever, were not convinced that she belonged there and asked her to
show identification.309 Siyonbola showed the officers her student ID,
but was detained for nearly twenty minutes while campus police investigated whether she was in fact a Yale student.310 A spokesperson for
Yale explained that the encounter took this long because the name on
Siyonbola’s campus ID was her preferred name, which did not match
her name in university records.311
In the end, the police left without formally arresting Siyonbola,
who was earning her master’s degree in African studies at Yale.312
When asked whether she felt the police acted appropriately,
Siyonbola responded, “[A]bsolutely not. I know with absolute certainty that if I was white 1) the police would not have been called . . .
and that 2) if they were, I would not have been detained for nearly 20
(minutes) for absolutely no reason.”313
In December 2018, Jermaine Massey, an African American man,
was confronted by a white hotel security guard police while he was
sitting in the lobby of a DoubleTree by Hilton hotel in Portland, Oregon, talking on his cellphone with his mother.314 The security guard
accused him of loitering, then called the police.315 Massey, who was a
registered guest at the hotel, was told by police to pack up his belongings and leave the hotel or face trespass charges,316 even after Massey

309

Id.

See Matthew Ormseth, Yale Says Police “Followed Procedures” after White Student Reported Presence of Black Student on Campus, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-yale-sleeping-student-20180510-story.html [https://
perma.cc/7FY5-G2K6] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
310

311

Id.

Christina Caron, A Black Yale Student Was Napping, and a White Student Called the
Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/nyregion/yale-black-stu
dent-nap.html [https://perma.cc/8FDL-QS3Q]. Siyonbola founded the Yoruba Cultural Institute
in Brooklyn and is the author of a book about African history and diaspora migration. Id.
312

313

Ormseth, supra note 310.

R

See Associated Press, Portland, Oregon Hotel Fires Two After Police Eject Black Guest
from Lobby, GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2018 16:50 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/
dec/29/portland-oregon-hotel-fires-two-police-eject-black-guest-lobby [https://perma.cc/C8B276LR]; Portland, Oregon, Hotel Calls Cops on Black Guest in Lobby, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2018,
9:08 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/portland-oregon-hotel-calls-cops-on-black-guest-inlobby/ [https://perma.cc/4C4Z-TSLS].
314

315

Portland, Oregon, Hotel Calls Cops on Black Guest in Lobby, supra note 314.

Cydney Henderson, Guest Says Hilton ‘Racially Profiled’ Him by Calling Police over
Lobby Phone Call, USA TODAY (Dec. 26, 2018 6:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel
/news/2018/12/26/guest-hilton-racially-profiled-him-called-police-over-phone-call/2417679002/
[https://perma.cc/H5DS-YDYX].
316
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told them he was a guest of the hotel and showed them the room key
sleeve that listed his room number.317
In each of the instances described above, racial bias—whether explicit or implicit—likely played a role in the decision to involve the
police in the first place or in the way in which the responding officers
handled the situation once on the scene. I—an Asian American woman—have sat at a table at many a Starbucks without ordering anything while my husband made a purchase, and I have never been
asked by store employees to leave. My husband, who is also Asian
American, has occupied a seat at Peet’s, another coffee shop, without
purchasing anything while waiting for me to make a purchase, and he
has never been asked to purchase something or leave, let alone been
arrested by police for such action. I am sure many non-black persons
have been slow on the golf course without being asked to leave or
having the police called on them. I am also sure many a non-black
student has fallen asleep in the common area of their residence hall
without having someone call the police to investigate if they belonged
there.
Under Justice Rehnquist’s definition of probable cause, an arrest
in any of the above-described cases would likely be considered justifiable, as police could easily meet Justice Rehnquist’s very low threshold for probable cause.318 While several of the incidents did not result
in an arrest, the fact remains that a different set of officers may have
chosen to exercise their arrest discretion differently and, under Justice
Rehnquist’s definition of probable cause, would likely have had the
law on their side had they decided to effectuate an arrest.319
I want to return to District of Columbia v. Wesby, the case discussed earlier where twenty-one African Americans were arrested,
taken into custody, and charged with unlawful entry for attending a
party in D.C.320 Though Wesby may not be as widely recognized as the
317 See Michael Brice-Saddler, Oregon Hotel Fires Employees Seen on Video Evicting Black
Guest, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/29/port
land-hotel-fires-employees-seen-evicting-black-guest-video/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b0fee
abfa8cd [https://perma.cc/9FZ5-UBH6]; Mihir Zaveri, Doubletree in Portland Fires 2 Employees
After Kicking out Black Man Who Made Call from Lobby, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/us/black-man-kicked-out-hotel-portland.html [https://perma.cc/
J9Q4-622D] (“Mr. Massey said that he left the hotel after collecting his things from his room so
as ‘not to make a bad situation worse.’ He then drove himself to a nearby Sheraton.”).
318 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 731 (1983).
319 In many states, refusing to leave a business’ premises after being asked to leave constitutes trespass. See, e.g., State v. Marcoplos, 572 S.E.2d 820, 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Cleveland
v. Dickerson, 60 N.E.3d 686, 688–89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (en banc).
320 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
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Starbucks incident, in some ways it is much more significant from a
legal perspective. The case made it all the way to the Supreme Court
and demonstrates the Court’s support for police officers’ broad arrest
power.321
According to the Court, D.C. police received a phone complaint
around 1:00 AM about “loud music and illegal activities at a house in
Northeast D.C.”322 The caller stated that the house had been vacant
for several months, a fact that several other neighbors confirmed
when police officers arrived at the house.323 When the officers arrived,
they “heard loud music playing inside.”324 The officers knocked on the
front door, and one of the partygoers let the officers into the house.325
Inside, the officers smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and cups
of liquor on the floor.326 In the living room, the officers found several
scantily dressed women with cash in their garter belts giving lap
dances to men holding cash and cups of alcohol.327 Several of the
partygoers scattered when they saw the uniformed officers.328 Upstairs, the officers found a naked woman with several men in a bedroom with a mattress, open condom wrappers, and lit candles on the
floor.329
When asked by the officers, several partygoers said they were
there for a bachelor party but, according to the police, could not identify the bachelor.330 The officers learned that a woman named Peaches
had organized the party.331 When contacted by the police, Peaches
said she had left the party to go to the store; she also stated that she
was renting the house.332 The police reached out to the homeowner,
who explained that he had been negotiating a lease with Peaches, but
that they had failed to reach an agreement.333 The owner also stated
that he had not given Peaches or anyone else permission to use his
house for a party.334 After speaking with the homeowner, the officers
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334

Id.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id. Peaches later admitted that she did not actually have permission to use the house. Id.
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arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry and drove them to the police station where they were charged with disorderly conduct.335
The charges against the partygoers were eventually dropped,336
which suggests the government realized either that it would be difficult to prove the elements of unlawful entry337 or that prosecuting
these young black men for such a minor offense would widely be
viewed as an unwise use of scarce prosecutorial resources.
The partygoers, Respondents, sued the District of Columbia and
five of its officers for false arrest, claiming that they were arrested
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
D.C. law.338 They argued that, under D.C. case law, probable cause to
arrest required that officers have evidence the partygoers “knew or
should have known, upon entry, that such entry was against the will of
the owner,” and that the officers lacked such evidence.339 The District
Court granted the partygoers’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest for unlawful
entry.340 A jury awarded them $680,000 in compensatory damages,
and after attorney’s fees, the total award came to almost $1 million.341
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.342
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, relying primarily on two factors to justify its
conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the
partygoers: (1) the condition of the house, and (2) the partygoers’ conduct.343 Notably, the Court in Wesby failed (or refused) to recognize
that if the officers had come across twenty-one white male partygoers
doing the same sorts of activities in a more affluent neighborhood, it is
unlikely that the officers would have arrested those partygoers. DurId.
Id.
337 To obtain a conviction for unlawful entry, the government must prove five elements: (1)
the defendants voluntarily or purposely (not by accident or mistake), (2) entered a private dwelling, (3) without lawful authority, (4) against the will of the person lawfully in charge, and (5) the
defendants knew or should have known the entry was unlawful. See D.C. CODE § 22-3302. The
first four elements would have been easy to prove, so the case would have turned on whether the
defendants knew or should have known their entry into the house was unlawful. If Respondents
thought Peaches was renting the house and, therefore, had the right to invite them to the party,
they would not have had the requisite mens rea for the offense.
338 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 584.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 585.
342 Id. That all of the lower court judges found for Respondents suggests that the case was
not as cut and dry as represented by the Supreme Court. See id. at 589–93.
343 Id. at 586–87.
335
336
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ing oral argument, Justice Sotomayor was the only Justice who raised
the issue of race, remarking, “I suspect that if police officers arrived at
a wealthy home and it was white teenagers having a party,” and one of
the teenagers claimed they had permission to use the house and it was
unclear who invited everyone, “those kids wouldn’t be arrested.”344 To
drive her point home, Justice Sotomayor added, “[S]houldn’t we have
a rule that if we’re going to require mens rea at all, that police officers
should be treating people equally?”345
District of Columbia v. Wesby, like the Starbucks incident discussed earlier, illustrates that police officers have broad arrest power.
Since officers have limited resources, they cannot and will not use this
power to arrest everyone who is eligible to be arrested. The lower the
showing required for probable cause, the more discretion police officers have to arrest whomever they choose. As Devon Carbado
observes:
[P]recisely because [loitering, sleeping in a public place, panhandling, drinking in public, jaywalking, riding bicycles on
the sidewalk, etc.] are non-serious or vague, police officers
will have little difficulty establishing the requisite probable
cause to justify arresting people from committing them. For
example, if the law criminalizes jaywalking, and people regularly jaywalk, the question is not whether the police will have
probable cause (they will because many people jaywalk).
Rather, the question is whether the police will use that probable cause selectively to arrest members of particular groups
(for example, African-Americans). The short of it is that the
more law criminalizes activities in which many people engage, the wider the pool of people from which police officers
may pull to make arrests. . . . [Mass criminalization] provides
police officers with the kind of perpetual probable cause that
they can use to justify arresting African-Americans for a
wide range of non-serious activities.346
In line with Carbado’s observations on the breadth of police officer discretion in choosing which individuals to arrest, a 2011 study
found that, on average, a person of color has a 30 percent greater
chance of being arrested than a white person.347 Moreover, even
344 Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018)
(No. 15-1485).

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 344, at 61.
Devon Carbado, Predatory Policing, 83 UMKC L. REV. 545, 550–51 (2017).
347 Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect
Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011).
345
346
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though blacks make up only approximately 13.4 percent of the total
population in the United States,348 in 2017, blacks constituted 27.2 percent of all state and federal arrestees, which is more than double the
percentage of blacks in the total population.349
Given the statistics and cases discussed above, it appears that race
plays a role both in the exercise of police officers’ arrest discretion
and in post-hoc judicial affirmation of this probable cause.350 Implicit
biases can influence whether a police officer “decides to stop an individual for questioning,” whether the officer interrogates or frisks that
individual, and whether the officer decides to arrest that individual or
simply give her a warning.351
Contrast Justice Rehnquist’s not more likely true than false definition of probable cause with the commentary surrounding the issuance of a warrant in April 2018 to search the home and office of
Michael Cohen, President Donald Trump’s former attorney.352 When
a judicial officer is asked to issue a search warrant, the judicial officer
must find there is probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will
be found at the place to be searched.353 The amount of proof needed
to establish probable cause to search is usually considered to be the
same as the showing required for probable cause to arrest.354
After the Michael Cohen search warrant was issued, many commentators spoke as if the showing necessary for probable cause to issue a search warrant is very rigorous, a far cry from Justice
348 U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts United States, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/EMU5-5XFB] (July 1,
2018).
349 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in
the United States (2017), at tbl.43A (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-theu.s.-2017/tables/table-43/ [https://perma.cc/HFZ5-RMKG].
350 See Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the
Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 209 (2007) (noting that race “may affect the
existence of a prior criminal record even in the absence of recidivist tendencies on the part of the
suspect because of racial profiling at the arrest stage of the process”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135 (2012); Richardson, supra note 46, at
2038–39 (explaining how the operation of implicit racial biases can cause the police to target,
stop, and search Blacks more often than Whites).
351 Kang, supra note 350, at 1135.
352 See, e.g., Danny Cevallos, For Trump and Cohen, Attorney-Client Privilege Goes Only
So Far, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:37 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/
trump-cohen-attorney-client-privilege-goes-only-so-far-n864206 [https://perma.cc/YTG2YKGU].
353 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1(a) (5th ed. 2012).
354 Id. § 3.1(b) (“It is generally assumed by the Supreme Court and the lower courts that
the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to
arrest or probable cause to search.”).
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Rehnquist’s definition of probable cause as something less than a preponderance of the evidence.355 For example, Danny Cevallos, a criminal defense attorney and legal analyst for NBC News and MSNBC
commented, “ ‘Probable cause’ means the FBI would have to demonstrate to a magistrate that there was a substantial chance evidence of
criminal activity would be found in Cohen’s offices, or in a hotel
where he was living, which was also searched.”356
The fact that this was a search of an attorney’s home and office,
and not just any attorney—the President’s personal attorney—meant
the showing of probable cause had to be higher than for the ordinary
case. As Frank Figliuzzi, former FBI assistant director and current
MSNBC legal analyst, noted, “it’s really tough to get enough probable
cause and senior level DOJ approval to search an attorney’s office,
and so it goes all the way up to DOJ, and you have to show there’s a
substantial, pertinent reason to believe that evidence exists [of a
crime].”357
If we are willing to apply a robust showing of probable cause
when it comes to searching the home and office of an attorney suspected of very serious crimes, should we not insist on an equally or
more robust showing of probable cause when police officers arrest an
individual for a minor offense?358 Arguably, being arrested and taken
into custody is a far greater intrusion—a humiliating intrusion on an
individual’s liberty and dignity interests—than having one’s property
searched,359 yet we require a higher showing and make it more diffi355 See, e.g., Cevallos, supra note 352; Fmr. FBI Asst. Dir.: Michael Cohen Raid Required
Substantial Probable Cause (MSNBC television broadcast, Apr. 9, 2018), [hereinafter Cohen
Raid Required Substantial Probable Cause] http://www.msnbc.com/deadline-white-house/watch/
fmr-fbi-asst-dir-michael-cohen-raids-required-substantial-probable-cause-1206702147538 [https:/
/perma.cc/D64Z-HDL3].
356 Cevallos, supra note 352 (emphasis added).
357 Cohen Raid Required Substantial Probable Cause, supra note 355 (emphasis added).
358 The fact that the overwhelming majority of individuals who are arrested and charged
end up pleading guilty rather than fighting the charges at trial provides another reason to support a more robust showing for probable cause. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012)
(observing that “97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas”). As William Ortman notes, “a strict charging standard will be attractive
when an adjudicative system does not otherwise provide adequate certainty that the people it
punishes are guilty.” Ortman, supra note 26, at 540. If many of the individuals who plead guilty
are doing so not because they are guilty, but because the incentives deter them from asserting
their right to a trial by jury, it would be best to require a more robust showing of probable cause
at the arrest stage than the one suggested by Justice Rehnquist in Texas v. Brown.
359 In United States v. Watson, Justice Powell noted the anomaly created by a rule that
allows police officers with probable cause to arrest individuals in public without a warrant when
the general rule in the search context is that officers must obtain a warrant prior to searching an
individual’s property:
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cult for police when they seek to search the property of a wealthy
attorney suspected of serious white collar crimes than when police
seek to arrest black and brown individuals for relatively minor offenses. Probable cause should involve a more robust showing.360
CONCLUSION
When Justice Rehnquist suggested more than thirty-five years
ago in his plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown that probable cause to
arrest an individual or search one’s property need not “be correct or
more likely true than false,” he significantly lowered the bar for probable cause.361 Lower courts should reject Justice Rehnquist’s comment
on probable cause and insist upon a more robust showing for the protection of all civilians, and especially for black and brown individuals
who are often the subjects of heightened police interest. Rather than a
trivial showing that amounts to less than the preponderance of the
evidence standard used in civil cases, probable cause to arrest a person, to intrude on their liberty and dignity, and to place them into the
criminal justice system, should have more teeth.

Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and
since an arrest, the taking hold of one’s person, is quintessentially a seizure, it
would seem that the constitutional provision should impose the same limitations
upon arrests that it does upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument
can be made that the restrictions upon arrest perhaps should be greater. A search
may cause only annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the law-abiding citizen. . . . An arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether
the person seized is guilty or innocent. . . . Logic therefore would seem to dictate
that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the same extent as
searches.
423 U.S. 411, 428–29 (Powell, J., concurring).
360 Other legal scholars have suggested good ways to strengthen the showing necessary for
a search or arrest. Josh Bowers, for example, suggests police should take into account qualitative
considerations, such as the individual’s dignity, rather than simply relying upon quantitative calculations when assessing the constitutional reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search or
seizure. See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized
Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 989 (2014). Max Minzner proposes that
police should have to present hit data—showing how often they have been right or wrong about
having probable cause—when applying for a search warrant or when trying to justify a warrantless search after the fact. See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87
TEX. L. REV. 913, 915 (2009).
361 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).

